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1. Introduction 
 
In the past two decades, European banking markets have been subjected to structural 
changes, which were caused by modifications occurred in the external environment especially as 
a consequence of the increasing monetary and financial integration. The gradual liberalization of 
capital flows, the prospect of the European common market, the rapid pace of developments in 
information technology, the product/service innovation in financial markets, the 
internationalisation of banking activities, the phenomenon of disintermediation (the deterioration 
of the role of banks as financial intermediaries), and the concern for the competitive pressure 
from foreign rivals are undoubtedly some of the prominent structural features of the European 
banking sector. These forces have altered banking behavior and market structure. The main result 
of the reorganization of the credit system has been a sharp growth in the number of concentration 
processes in EU countries with vast implications for competition and concentration in the 
banking and financial sector: the enhanced competition has forced banks to look for a bigger size 
(in order to exploit potential economies of scale and/or scope) as well as better managerial 
capacity [X-efficiency] (in order to improve their overall efficiency). This has pushed banks to 
search for more efficient organizational solutions, greater variety of the offered services and 
stronger exploitation of scale economies.  
Moreover, the EU enlargement with countries from Central and Eastern Europe will 
influence the banking structure in the new EU financial landscape. The main features of the 
financial structure in these countries are a relatively low level of financial intermediation, a strong 
dominance of the banking system within the financial sector owing to the particular 
underdevelopment of capital markets in most countries, and a high degree of foreign involvement 
in most sector segments (Caviglia et.al., 2002). The banking sectors of the 10 new EU countries 
have been restructured and recapitalised, with clear implications on their competition status.  
As a consequence, a reduction in the number of operating banks occurred in most old 
(EU-15) and new EU country during the last five years. Mergers and acquisitions, failures and 
entry of new financial institutions have resulted in a decline in the number of banks operating in 
EU-15 and the 10 new EU countries of about 16% and 44% respectively in that time period 
(European Central Bank Reports, 2002, 2003).  
The above mentioned changes in banking industry structure have fueled a large literature 
on banking competition and concentration. The degree of banking competition and its association 
with market concentration, always a subject of some controversy, is a more relevant issue now 
than in earlier times and of vital importance for welfare-related public policy toward market   3
structure and conduct in the banking industry (Shaffer, 2004). These two tendencies (competition 
and concentration) seem to contrast each other, if we accept the theoretical proposition 
according to which a more concentrated market implies a lower degree of competition due to 
undesirable exercise of market power by banks. Other theories (e.g. contestability theory) 
maintain that, under particular conditions, competition and concentration can coexist. The theory 
of contestability (Baumol, 1982; Baumol et.al., 1982) assumes that firms can enter or leave 
rapidly any market without losing their capital and that potential competitors possess the same 
cost functions as firms that already serve in the market. These characteristics imply that in the 
contestable market the threat of potential entry constrains firms to price their products 
competitively. If these conditions are met, then external conditions will dominate internal 
conditions and guarantee non-collusive behaviour within that market. Moreover, others, like 
Jansen and De Haan (2003), suggest that there is no connection between concentration and 
market competition. 
There are also more general reasons why the market conditions in the banking industry 
deserve particular attention. The soundness and stability of the financial sector may in various 
ways be influenced by the degree of competition and concentration (Yeyati and Micco, 2003). 
From a theoretical point of view, competition may have a deleterious impact on stability if it 
causes banks’ charter value to drop, thus reducing the incentives for prudent risk-taking behavior. 
According to this view, the promise of extraordinary profits associated with the presence of 
market power reduces the agency problem of limited liability banks (namely, their propensity to 
gamble). Stiffer competition, instead, could lead to more aggressive risk taking, as documented in 
some empirical studies (Keeley, 1990; Cerasi and Daltung, 2000). On the other hand, a more 
concentrated system, inasmuch as it implies the presence of a few relatively large banks, is more 
likely to display a “too big to fail” problem by which large banks increase their risk exposure 
anticipating the unwillingness of the regulator to let the bank fail in the event of insolvency 
problems (Hughes and Mester, 1998).  
Moreover, competition in the banking industry, given the dominant role of banks in most 
countries, may have an impact on the likely effectiveness of monetary policy. A more 
monopolistic banking sector is able to obtain larger interest rate margins. Monopolistic pricing by 
banks will not transmit changes of central bank interest rates as fully as pure competitive pricing 
will do. This probably hampers monetary policy at least to some extent (Lensink and Sterken, 
2002). Moreover, Kashyap and Stein (1997) and Cecchetti (1999) argue that the banking system’s 
concentration and health are essential to the analysis of the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
These authors illustrate that within the European Monetary Union (EMU) there are substantial   4
differences in banking structures, which are likely to accentuate the differential impact of 
monetary policy across EMU members. According to these authors smaller banks are more likely 
to reduce lending in case of a monetary contraction, due to their weaker balance sheet structure 
and poorer ability to attract reasonably priced external funds. Countries with a high concentration 
ratio (a relatively large fraction of bigger banks) would be affected less by the credit channel.  
To judge the implications of those developments, it is necessary to assess the current 
market structure of the banking industry, to record the degree of competition, and to investigate 
the impact of consolidation on the market structure and the behavior of banks. This paper seeks to 
measure the degree of concentration and competition in the new enlarged European banking 
landscape and investigate competitive conditions in the major European banking markets over the 
period 1998-2002. We describe the patterns of consolidation and concentration using traditional 
indicators of market structure. As these indicators rely on the indirect inferences of market 
concentration and market power, we conduct an empirical analysis based on the method 
developed by Panzar and Rosse (1977, 1987) to assess changes in the competitive structure in EU 
markets (aggregate and major individual) following the consolidation process in the examined 
period. Panzar and Rosse show that the sum of the elasticities of a firm’s revenue with respect to 
the firm’s input prices (the so-called H statistic) can be used to identify the nature of the market 
structure in which the firm operates. Moreover we assess results separately for large, medium-
size and small banks, which may face different competitive conditions.  
This paper extends previous studies on competition and concentration in European 
banking in several respects. While a number of studies have examined the effects of bank 
consolidation on competitive conditions in the EU banking industry, hardly any systematic 
research has been carried out for the after-EMU period, covering the new European economies. 
Moreover, in the empirical analysis, competitive conditions are estimated in terms of interest 
revenues, and total operating revenues. This is considered to be highly relevant since as market 
conditions have become tougher and more competitive, the focus of profitability management has 
tended to shift away from interest earnings towards fees and other income
1. This evolution was a 
result of both increasing non-interest income and the ongoing reduction in interest income. 
However, banks’ income streams (other than traditional retail) have suffered, due to the 
significant stock market correction that began in nearly 2000
2. Therefore, it is very important to 
                                                 
1 In 2002 the non-interest income source represented around 40% of the total operating income of EU 
banks, compared with only 30% in 1995 (ECB, 2004). 
2 By the end of 2002, stock prices had dropped to levels that were last seen in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of autumn 1998 (ECB, 2004).   5
examine competition in terms of organic income (interest income and fee and commission 
income), since these are the most stable income sources presented in the banks’ financial reports.  
The structure of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 displays two formal 
concentration indices and applies them to al the EU (old and new) countries. This section briefly 
discusses methodological and institutional issues regarding competition and concentration in the 
new European banking landscape. Section 3 reviews the literature and modern empirical methods 
(structural and non-structural) of measuring competition among banks. More specifically, we 
illustrate the Panzar and Rosse test used to assess competitive conditions in the banking system, 
with particular reference to the theoretical framework, the empirical implications and the existing 
studies employing this methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical model used in our 
econometric examination and describes the data used in our research. Section 5 provides an 
analysis of the data with the descriptive statistics of the variables. Section 6 contains the 
estimation results, and discusses the empirical evidence of testing the Panzar and Rosse model. 
Some conclusions are offered in the final section.  
 
2.  Indicators of market structure 
  
The EU banking sector is still very fragmented in terms of national and sometimes even 
local characteristics. In some countries a large part of the banking activity is in the hands of a few 
nationwide banks, while in some others the market share of banks that operate on a nationwide 
basis is rather small. This section covers developments in the structure of the banking industry in 
the new EU banking environment.  
There are several common indicators of market structure, including the number of banks 
in each country, the k-bank concentration ratios (CRk) and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). It is theoretically not clear whether a concentration ratio or the HHI is the most 
appropriate measure for market concentration (Sander and Kleimeier, 2004). The importance of 
the latest two concentration ratios
3 arises from their ability to capture structural features of a 
market.  
Due to its simplicity and limited data requirement, the CRk
4 concentration ratio is one of 
the most commonly used concentration indexes in empirical literature, which sums the market 
                                                 
3 There are also other measures of competition (see Davies [1979] for an overview), but the CRk and the 
HHI are the most commonly measures used in the literature. 
4 Summing only over the market shares of the k largest banks in the market, the k-bank concentration ratio 
takes the form:   6
shares of the k largest banks allocating equal weighting to each bank. This measure belongs to the 
class of discrete measures (Bikker and Haaf, 2000b). Supporters of these measures maintain the 
view that the behaviour of a market dominated by a small number of banks is very unlikely to be 
influenced by the total number of firms operating in the market.   
However, Phillips (1976), along with many others, has criticized the concentration ratio 
because it ignores size inequalities within the leading group of firms (which itself is arbitrarily 
defined) and emphasizes only the leading group and all other firms. Similarly, he claims the 
relationship between the concentration ratio and firm numbers is variable and ambiguous. The 
competitive behaviour of the smaller market players might force the larger players to act 
competitively as well. Thus, for example, it fails to reflect the impact of shifts in the positions of 
market leader banks (as it attaches equal weighting to the k largest banks) and completely ignores 
smaller ones. Moreover, there are no rules for defining the appropriate value of k; accordingly, 
such values are arbitrarily established.  
The HHI
5, which is the sum of the squared market shares of the individual banks, is the 
most widely used measure of concentration. Its advantage is that it makes full use of the 
information obtainable from the distribution of market positions
6. Owing to the manner in which 
it is calculated, it attaches greater weighting to larger banks and allows usage of all banks. By 
construction, the HHI has an upper value of 10,000 in the case of a monopolist firm with a 100% 
share of the market; the index tends to zero in the case of a large number of firms with very small 
market shares for each one of them
7. Federal Reserve and the Department of Justice (DOJ) use 
HHI derived from deposit shares as an initial screen to determine the possible effects of a bank 
merger
8.   
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giving equal emphasis to the k leading banks, but neglecting the many small banks in the market. 
5 The HHI takes the form: 
∑ = =
n




6 For that reason, this index is often called the “full information” index. 
7 Davies (1979) analyses the sensitivity of the HHI to its two constituent parts, i.e. the number of banks in 
the market and the inequality in market shares among the different banks and finds that the index becomes 
less sensitive to changes in the number of banks the larger the number of banks in the industry. 
8 The DOJ divides the spectrum of market concentration into three roughly delineated categories that can be 
broadly characterized as unconcentrated (HHI below 1,000), moderately concentrated (HHI 1,000-1,800), 
and highly concentrated (HHI above 1,800). With respect to bank mergers, the DOJ’s merger guidelines 
say that if the change in the HHI in any local market could be greater than 200 and the post-merger market 
would have an HHI of at least 1,800, then the merger could create or enhance market power or facilitate its   7
In our analysis we present the indicators of the market structure for all the twenty-five 
EU banking systems. Our concentration measures (5-firm concentration ratio [CR5] and HHI) are 
derived from deposits, because it is assumed that the level of a bank’s deposits in a market is an 
indication of the level of its other banking services in that same market
9. 
The simplest measure of market concentration is the number of credit institutions in the 
market. This measure simply conveys the number of choices available to consumers. The trend of 
consolidation that has been observed over several years in the banking industry continued in most 
countries, and was mostly apparent in the declining number of credit institutions. From 1998 to 
2002, the number of financial institutions in the old EU banking landscape reduced by about 16 
percent, from 9,260 in 1998 to 7,756 in 2002 (Table 1). This broad decline in the number of 
institutions is consistent with the notion that bank consolidation is proceeding at fast pace (at 
lower pace than in the 90s). The decline in the number of credit institutions reflects mergers 
rather than closures of existing institutions. The largest reduction in the number of institutions has 
taken place among the smaller savings and co-operative banks. Similarly, the number of banks in 
seven of the new EU countries dropped significantly by 44 percent, from 1,557 in 1997 to 872 in 
2001
10 (Table 1), mainly due to banking sector restructuring (e.g. liquidations, acquisitions, rapid 
improvements in the legal and regulatory infrastructure). 
At the country level (Table 1), the pace of consolidation greatly varied, with large 
countries showing the most substantial decrease in the total number of institutions. Major 
reductions in the number of institutions occurred in Germany (-27%), and France (-17%). The 
number of banks remained almost constant in Greece, while Sweden conversely reported a 
substantial increase. Regarding the major new EU country, Poland, the decrease in the number of 
banks (-48%) has been the result of consolidations, mergers, takeovers and liquidations. External 
factors such as mergers of foreign or regional banks have also affected the concentration of the 







                                                                                                                                                 
exercise. Changes smaller than 200 points are deemed to be, in general, of little economic significance 
(Jayaratne and Hall, 1996; Laderman, 2003). 
9 The concentration ratios using total assets are available upon request. 
10 There is some historic and market unavailability on data for all the new EU countries.   8
Table 1: Number of credit institutions 
Country 1998  2002 Change Country  1997 2001  Change
Austria 898  823 -8.4% Czech  Rep.  50 38  -24.0%
Belgium 120  111 -7.5% Estonia 22 14  -36.4%
Denmark 212  178 -16.0% Hungary 45 41  -8.9%
Finland 348  369 +6.0% Lithuania  22 32  +45.6%
France 1,226  1,011 -17.5% Poland  1,378 713  -48.3%
Germany 3,238  2,363 -27.0% Slovakia  29 21  -27.6%
Greece 59  61 +3.4% Malta 11 13  +18.2%
Ireland 78  85 +9.0% 7 New EU  1,557 872 -44.0%
Italy 934  822 -12.0%   
Luxembourg 212  177 -16.5%    
Netherlands 634  539 -15.0%    
Portugal 227  202 -11.0%    
Spain 402  359 -10.7%    
Sweden 148  216 +45.9%    
UK 521  440 -15.5%    
EU-15 9,260  7,756 -16.2%   
Source: Czech National Bank (CNB), Bank of Lithuania (BoL), National Bank of Poland, Central Bank of 
Malta, Bank of Estonia, European Central Bank (July 2002, November 2003). 
 
As we can observe from Table 2, the banking concentration ratio seems to be reduced in 
the EU-15 region, on aggregate and in most of the countries in the period 1998-2002. The HHI 
stands at 83 in 2002, compared with 99 in 1998. Despite large-scale privatization and more liberal 
public policy towards the elimination of entry barriers, the banking sectors of the 10 new EU 
countries remained much more concentrated throughout the sample period than those of the EU-
15 countries. The HHI for deposits stands at 262 in 2002, Furthermore, what is observed is a 
slight reduction in concentration in the 10 new EU countries. This means that while the number 
of banks has fallen in these countries, this decline has not systematically resulted in an increase in 
concentration. A number of explanations can be presented, mentioned also by Gelos and Roldos 
(2004). First, there was the legacy from the pre-market-reform era, namely large state-owned 
banks concentrating a large share of deposits. Second, all these countries pursued liberal entry 
policies and a large number of banks entered the markets. Third, the state-owned banks suffered a 
sharp reduction in market share, partly as a result of clean-up operations before their privatization 
to strategic (and mostly foreign) investors. A consolidation trend has only recently begun to take 
hold in the region, being driven by stronger banks being forced to absorb weaker ones to ensure 
continued stability, by shareholders deciding to exit the market, and by mergers of the parent 
companies of foreign banks present in the region. 
 
   9
Table 2: Concentration measures 
Country Year  CR5  HHI Country  CR5 HHI  Country  CR HHI 
Austria  1998 66.50 1,779  Luxembourg 36.01  434  Lithuania  99.35  3,505 
  1999 61.62 1,627    35.76  413    98.96 3,697 
  2000 64.34 1,313    35.06  408    96.46 3,225 
  2001 61.37 1,116    35.60  438    94.94 2,883 
    2002 62.39 1,132      38.36  405    80.54 2,632 
Belgium  1998 89.27 2,432  Netherlands  90.11 2,610  Malta  99.61 4,245 
  1999 89.57 2,548    88.91 2,402    99.17 4,171 
  2000 88.21 2,266    89.87 2,474    95.82 3,532 
  2001 89.96 2,228    89.75 2,455    96.28 3,075 
   2002  90.30  2,293     90.01  2,437     98.99  3,655 
Denmark  1998 81.61 2,441  Portugal  79.15 1,568  Poland  75.31 1,691 
  1999 82.59 2,489    77.67 1,547    66.60 1,359 
  2000 84.23 2,859    80.37 1,605    64.44 1,162 
  2001 82.77 2,782    75.11 1,385    61.13 1,046 
   2002  82.83  2,947     72.61  1,301     60.51  1,047 
Finland 1998  n.a.  5,488  Spain  60.99 1,147  Slovakia  78.40 1,943 
  1999  n.a.  5,170   61.30  1,159   79.04  2,051 
  2000 98.89 5,244    61.68 1,220    73.55 1,842 
  2001 97.40 5,136    58.09 1,113    71.66 1,533 
   2002  96.99  5,056     54.28  911     77.12  1,707 
France  1998  50.55  644 Cyprus  92.97  2,776 Slovenia  77.82  2,061 
  1999  44.35  513   90.92  2,684   76.72  2,026 
  2000  42.45  475   88.03  2,067   75.93  2,030 
  2001  42.83  479   85.67  2,092   76.82  2,250 
   2002  41.23  468     88.54  2,447     75.51  2,145 
Germany  1998  37.92  385 Sweden  93.46  2,471 Czech  Rp.  88.01  2,406 
  1999  34.74  315   87.08  2,056   83.94  2,065 
  2000  44.55  463   86.81  2,073   80.88  1,884 
  2001  42.27  416   84.09  1,935   79.07  1,725 
   2002  40.67  387     85.98  2,056     76.47  1,609 
Greece  1998 96.70 2,820  UK  42.28  483  Estonia  n.a. 4,781 
  1999 83.26 1,881    40.26  453    n.a. 5,052 
  2000 81.52 1,804    37.01  430    n.a. 5,381 
  2001 80.23 1,754    37.48  442    n.a. 5,841 
   2002  84.18  1,843     37.90  464     n.a.  5,844 
Ireland  1998 65.55 1,551  Hungary  70.97 1,569  EU-15  12.94 99 
  1999 64.16 1,431    69.64 1,492    12.50  92 
  2000 61.81 1,318    63.55 1,204    12.75  92 
  2001 60.63 1,202    64.11 1,170    12.19  89 
   2002  64.64  1,145     63.83  1,222     11.49  83 
Italy 1998  55.41  796  Latvia  78.15  2,026  new EU  36.10 384 
  1999 53.40  739   65.23 1,335    32.26  332 
  2000 48.26  624   69.50 1,446    30.69  316 
  2001 46.75  561   70.47 1,259    29.24  291 
   2002  40.80  441     68.66  1,244     27.31  262 
Source: FitchIBCA’s Bankscope database and own estimations.   10
Germany has the lowest HHI (standing at 387 in 2002), followed by Luxembourg, Italy, 
the UK and France, countries that also exhibit relatively low concentration ratios. On the other 
hand Finland has the highest level of concentration among all 15 EU countries (HHI stands at 
5,056 in 2002)
11. These statistics suggest that some of the smaller European countries’ banking 
markets, at least those which continue to be purely national, are highly concentrated.  
Regarding the 10 new EU countries, Estonia exhibits the highest concentration ratios (the 
HHI is 5,844 in 2002), while the largest banking market, Poland, presents the lowest one (HHI 
stands at 1,047 in 2002). In the majority of the new EU countries we can observe a decline in 
concentration, though it remains in relatively high levels. In Czech Republic, despite the high 
level of concentration, the market share of the largest banks has been steadily declining. 
Particularly apparent is the growing significance of medium-sized banks, which mainly comprise 
foreign bank subsidiaries. These indicators show that banking sectors in new EU countries appear 
to have a high and decreasing (in most cases) degree of concentration, while in the EU-15 
countries the banking sectors are on average less concentrated. 
However, these standard measures of market concentration can only serve as crude 
indicators of competitive conditions in the banking sector. Moreover, these are inherently static 
measures, describing the situation at one point of time, and tell us nothing about the actuality of 
any collusive behaviour by market participants. Therefore, the next section moves beyond the 
largely descriptive approach followed so far and uses, both theoretically and practically, an 
econometric method to assess changes in competitive conditions. 
 
3.  Review of literature and techniques 
 
The literature approach on the measurement of competition can be divided into two major 
streams:  structural and non-structural. The structural approach  embraces the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) and the efficiency hypothesis, as well as a number of formal 
approaches with roots in industrial organisation theory. These two models investigate, 
respectively, whether a highly concentrated market causes collusive behaviour among the larger 
banks resulting in superior market performance, or whether it is the efficiency of larger banks that 
enhances their performance. These hypothesis although lacking formal back-up in micro-
economic theory, have frequently been tested in the banking industry and provide policy makers 
measures of market structure and performance as well as their interrelationship. 
                                                 
11 Similar are the results if we use the CR3 and CR5.   11
However, due to several deficiencies arising from the application of the structural 
approach, developments in industrial organization, as well as the recognition of the need to 
endogenise the market structure, many empirical studies follow a new course. This novel 
approach to competition evaluation has emerged under the impulse of the New Empirical 
Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach. This approach, pioneered by Iwata (1974) and strongly 
enhanced by the papers of Bresnahan (1982, 1989), Lau (1982) and Panzar and Rosse (1989), 
tests competition and the use of market power, and stresses the analysis of banks’ competitive 
conduct in the absence of structural measures.  
3.1.  The SCP and the efficiency hypotheses 
We begin with a brief review of the SCP and the efficiency literature – both theoretical 
and empirical – as it relates to the banking industry. Many studies in the banking literature and in 
the more general industrial organisation find a positive relationship between profitability and 
measures of market structure – either concentration or market share.  
The SCP hypothesis is a general statement on the determinants of market performance. 
This relationship in banking markets, as noted by Gilbert (1984), “…was initiated in the 1960s, 
when the federal bank regulatory agencies began responding to new legal requirement 
concerning the effects of bank mergers on competition”. The SCP hypothesis asserts that banks 
are able to extract monopolistic rents in concentrated markets by their ability to offer lower 
deposit rates and charge higher loan rates. This finding reflects the setting of prices less 
favourable to consumers in more concentrated markets as a result of collusion or other forms of 
non-competitive behaviour. The more concentrated the market, the less the degree of competition. 
The smaller the number of firms and the more concentrated the market structure, the greater is the 
probability that firms in the market will achieve a joint price-output configuration that approaches 
the monopolistic solution. Empirically, the SCP relationship is usually tested by examining the 
relationship between profitability and market concentration with a positive relationship indicating 
non-competitive behaviour in concentrated markets. A related theory is the relative-market-power 
hypothesis (RMP) which asserts that only firms with large market shares and well-differentiated 
products are able to exercise market power in pricing these products and earn supernormal profits 
(Berger, 1995). 
There have been many empirical studies of the SCP hypothesis in the banking industry 
(an extensive literature review is covered by Rhoades (1977), Gilbert (1984), Molyneux et.al. 
(1996) and Staikouras (2001)). Rhoades (1977), for example, in his survey of 39 studies from the 
period 1961-1977, determined that 30 of these studies had been successful in finding support for   12
the basic validity of the SCP hypothesis. Among others, Short (1979), Bourke (1989), and 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) are using several independent variables related to characteristics 
both internal and external to bank’s operations, in order to explain bank profitability either at an 
international or European level. For example, Bourke (1989), in the context of an international 
comparison of banks’ profitability, devote a part of it to apply the methodology to a sample of 
seventeen French banks over the period 1972 to 1981. In the European field, Molyneux and 
Forbes (1993) tested the SCP hypothesis using annual banking data for the period 1986-1989. 
The main finding was a significantly positive concentration ratio. Lloyd-Williams et.al. (1994) 
found support for the SCP hypothesis in the case of Spanish banks for the period 1986-1988.  
  A challenge to the SCP hypothesis interpretation is the efficient hypothesis (Gilbert, 
1984). Market concentration is not a random event but rather the result in industries where some 
firms possess superior efficiency. This hypothesis states that efficient firms increase in size and 
market share because of their ability to generate higher profits, which usually leads to higher 
market concentration. In principle, firms in markets with a large dispersion of efficiencies could 
be either more or less efficient on average than firms in other markets. However, proponents of 
the efficiency hypothesis usually assume (explicitly or implicitly) that the dispersion of 
efficiencies within markets that creates high levels of concentration also results in greater than 
average efficiency in these markets, yielding a positive profit-concentration relationship.  
  Evidence supporting the efficient hypothesis have been found for studies of the US 
banking system [Brozen (1982), Smirlock (1985), Evanoff and Fortier (1988) etc.]. Ravenscraft 
(1983) found a positive profit-market share relationship. This may reflects higher product quality 
and lower unit costs in relatively large business units. Smirlock (1985) models bank profitability 
as a function of market share, concentration, and an interaction term between market share and 
concentration (as well as several control variables) for over 2,700 unit state banks and he provides 
evidence in favour of the efficient hypothesis. Peristiani (1997) shows that acquiring banks 
achieve moderate improvements in scale efficiency. This moderate rise in scale efficiency may 
partly be attributed to the fact that smaller target markets are on average less scale-efficient than 
their acquirers. 
However, generally speaking, the banking studies have not found a positive relationship 
as consistently as has been found in the inter-industry studies (among others Rhoades and Rutz 
(1981), Schuster (1984), and Moore (1998)). Gilbert (1984), in a survey article, find thirty-two 
out of forty-four studies have produced some evidence of significant association between market 
structure and measures of performance, with the direction of influence as indicated by the 
structure-performance hypothesis. In seven of those thirty-two studies the coefficients on   13
measures of market structure are not statistically significant in most of the reported equations. In 
two papers the coefficients on market concentration are significant but have signs that are 
opposite from those indicated by the traditional SCP hypothesis theory.    
  A serious problem applying this approach has been the interpretation of the positive 
relationship between profitability and concentration (when it can be found) and whether it 
supports the SCP or the efficiency hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 1989; Hannan, 1991). 
Furthermore, Kaufman (1965) notes that market structure and performance may not be related 
linearly. It may reasonably be expected that the impact of a change in structure on performance 
becomes greater the closer structure approaches total concentration. Simultaneously, Clark (1986) 
notes that the failure to identify a more consistently strong, positive, and statistically significant 
direct relationship between market concentration and commercial bank profitability may be due 
in part to problems with the methodology employed. Much of the criticism is related to the one-
way causality – from market structure to market performance – inherent in the original model as 
it is still being applied in many banking studies, and to the failure by recent studies to incorporate 
new developments in the theory of industrial organisations. 
3.2.   The New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach 
Due to these deficiencies of the structural approach, and the developments in industrial 
organization a new approach capturing the field of competition evaluation has emerged under the 
impulse of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) approach. The first model, the 
Iwata model, allows the estimation of conjectural variation values for individual banks supplying 
a homogeneous product in an oligopolistic market (Iwata, 1974). This measure, to the best of our 
knowledge, has been applied to the banking industry only once, from Shaffer and DiSalvo (1994), 
in a two banks’ market.  
The second method, applied in the banking sector, is based in the procedure first 
suggested by Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982). It requires the estimation of a simultaneous-
equation model where a parameter representing the degree of market power of firms is included. 
The key parameter in this test is interpreted as the extent to which the average firm’s perceived 
marginal revenue schedule deviates from the demand schedule, and thus represents the degree of 
market power actually exercises by the firms in the sample. A distinguishing feature of this 
technique is that it does not require firm-specific data, but utilises aggregate industry data. 
Bresnahan’s approach (1982) was first developed for banking by Shaffer (1989 and 1993) 
for, respectively, the US loan markets and the Canadian banking industry. Suominen (1994) 
extends the model and applies it to the evaluation of banking competition in Finland for the   14
period 1960-1984 during which the interest rates applied by banks were tightly regulated. Based 
on the same methodology, Neven and Roller (1999) estimates a structural model for the loan 
market with data from six European countries between 1981 and 1989, while Bikker and Haaf 
(2000a) examines competition in the markets for deposits and loans in nine countries in the 
1990s. Angelini and Cetorelli (2000) evaluates competition in Italian banking, while Toolsema 
(2002) analyses the consumer credit market in the Netherlands in the period 1993-1999. Uchida 
and Tsutsui (2004) investigate competition in the Japanese banking sector, and Canhoto (2004) 
estimates the model by using data from Portuguese banking in the period 1990-1995.  
In addition, based also in the NEIO approach, a third, alternative, approach has been 
created for competition evaluation. The Panzar and Rosse
12 (1977 and 1987) approach for testing 
market power relies on the premise that banks will employ different pricing strategies in response 
to a change in input costs depending on the market structure in which they operate. In other 
words, market power is measured by the extent to which changes in factor prices (unit price of 
funds, capital and labor) are reflected in revenues (interest or total revenues). The test is derived 
from a general banking market model, which determines equilibrium output and the equilibrium 
number of banks by maximizing profits at both the bank level and the industry level. This test 
often has a clear interpretation when applied to the study of markets, given that H represents the 
percentage variation of the equilibrium revenue derived from the unit percent increase in the price 
of all factors used by the firm. Panzar and Rosse define a measure of competition, the “H-
statistic”, as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced-form revenue function with respect to factor 
prices. They show that this statistic can reflect the structure and conduct of the market to which 
the firm belongs.  
Concerning the value of H, Panzar and Rosse assert that H is negative when the 
competitive structure is a monopoly, a perfectly colluding oligopoly, or a conjectural variations 
short-run oligopoly. Under these conditions, an increase in input prices will increase marginal 
costs, reduce equilibrium output and subsequently  reduce total revenues. Under perfect 
competition, the H-statistic is unity
13. In this case, an increase in input prices raises both marginal 
and average costs without altering the optimal output of any individual  firm under certain 
conditions. Exit of some firms increase the demand faced by each of the remaining firms, thereby 
leading to an increase in prices and total revenues by the same amount as the rise in costs (i.e. 
                                                 
12 The first application of this test has been made by Rosse and Panzar (1977), who employed a cross-
section of data in order to estimate the H-statistic for the newspaper firms in the local media markets. 
13 Shaffer (1982) shows that the H statistic is also unity for a natural monopoly operating in a perfectly 
contestable market and also for a sales-maximizing firm that is subject to breakeven constraints. 
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demand is perfectly elastic). If H is between zero and unity, the market structure is characterised 
by monopolistic competition. Under monopolistic competition where potential entry leads to a 
contestable markets equilibrium, revenues will increase less than proportionally to the input 
prices, as the demand for banking products facing individual banks is inelastic. Table 3 
summarises these findings, as have also been expensively presented by other authors).  
A critical feature of the H-statistic is that the tests must be undertaken on observations 
that are in long-run equilibrium. The empirical test for equilibrium is justified on the grounds that 
competitive capital markets will equalize risk-adjusted rate of returns across banks such that, in 
equilibrium, rates of return should not be correlated statistically with input prices. Therefore, to 
test for equilibrium one can calculate the Panzar and Rosse H statistic using the return on assets 
as the dependent variable in place of the total revenue (or the interest income) in the regression 
equation. A value of H<0 would show non-equilibrium, whereas H=0 would prove equilibrium 
(Table 3). However, if the sample is not in long-run equilibrium, it is true that H<0 no longer 
proves monopoly, but it remains true that H>0 disproves monopoly or conjectural variation short-
run oligopoly (Shaffer, 1985).   
 
Table 3: Interpretations of the H-statistic 
H statistics  Competitive environment test 
H≤0 Monopoly  equilibrium 
   Perfect colluding oligopoly 
   Conjectural variations short-rum oligopoly 
0<H<1  Monopolistic competition free entry equilibrium 
H=1 Perfect  competition 
   Natural monopoly in a perfectly contestable market 
   Sales maximizing firms subject to breakeven constraints 
 H statistics  Equilibrium test 
H<0 Disequilibrium 
H=0 Equilibrium 
Source: Rosse and Panzar (1977), Panzar and Rosse (1982, 1987), Shaffer (1982, 1983), Nathan and Neave 
(1989), Molyneux et. al. (1994), Hondroyiannis et.al. (1999). 
 
When applying the Panzar and Rosse technique to assess banks’ market conduct, various 
assumptions about banks’ production activity have to be made. Firstly, the extension of the 
Panzar and Rosse methodology to the banking industry requires to assume that banks are treated   16
as single product firms, producing intermediation services by using labor, physical capital, and 
financial capital as inputs (traditional intermediation approach). Secondly, one needs to assume 
that higher input prices are not associated with higher quality services that generate higher 
revenues, since such a correlation may bias the computed H statistic. This means, however, that if 
one rejects the hypothesis of a contestable competitive market, this bias cannot be too large 
(Molyneux et al., 1996). Among other underlying assumptions we can mention that: (a) banks are 
profit maximization firms; (b) the performance of these banks needs to be influenced by the 
actions of other market participants; (c) cost structure is homogenous; and (d) the price elasticity 
of demand is greater than unity (see also De Bandt and Davis, 2000).  
Despite these assumptions, equilibrium tests and other limitations (see Hempell, 2002) 
the model’s special advantages make it a valuable tool in assessing market conditions. 
Particularly, an important advantage of the method is that, because revenues are estimated (and 
not output prices), data availability becomes much less of a constraint, since revenues are more 
likely to be observable than output prices and quantities or actual cost data. Also, the fact that the 
Panzar and Rosse model uses bank-level data allows for bank-specific differences in production 
function and type of operation (e.g. large vs. small, foreign vs. domestic, commercial vs. other 
types of financial institutions). Moreover, the estimation of the reduced-form revenue equations is 
often possible even though the structural equations cannot be estimated. This is of special 
importance in the case of the structural supply equation due to the often encountered lack of data 
for the supply side. Also, by not requiring a locational market definition a priori, the Panzar and 
Rosse framework avoids the potential bias caused by the misspecification of market boundaries; 
hence the H statistic will reflect the average of the bank’s conduct in each market for a bank that 
operates in more than one market (this remark holds in particular for large universal banks with 
sizeable foreign activities). Finally, unlike the SCP or the efficiency hypothesis, the Panzar and 
Rosse methodology analyzes directly the competitive conduct of banks, based on the comparative 
static properties of the reduced form revenue equations, without employing any structural 
measures. 
 
3.3.  The Panzar and Rosse methodology studies in banking 
 
Only a limited number of studies have applied the Panzar-Rosse methodology for the 
banking industry, and as far as we are aware, only one study has provided an extensive literature 
review capturing this issue (Shaffer, 2004). In this context, the following subsection provides an 
extensive review of the studies that applied the Panzar and Rosse methodology in the banking 
industry. To compare our results from the model implementation in the new European banking   17
landscape with those in the literature, Annex 1 summarises the results of other studies applying 
the Panzar-Rosse model. Most of them indicate that banks earn revenues (interest income or total 
revenues) as if they are under conditions of monopolistic competition.  
One of the first applications of the Panzar and Rosse methodology to banking was a 
series of cross-sectional studies by Shaffer (1981a, b and 1982) which examined the competitive 
position for a sample of unit banks in New York. He concludes that banks behave neither as 
monopolists nor as perfectly competitive firms in long-run equilibrium. Nathan and Neave (1989) 
use an approach similar to Shaffer to study data for Canadian banks, trust companies and 
mortgage companies between 1982 and 1984. They estimated the H-statistic at 0.680 and 0.729 
for 1983 and 1984 respectively, values that are significantly different from both zero and unity. 
However, for 1982 the perfect competition hypothesis could not be rejected, since the H-statistic 
was estimated at 1.058. Their results for trust and mortgage institutions were rather similar.  
Bikker and Haaf (2000a,b) applied the methodology in the banking sectors of 23 
industrialised countries over the period 1988-1998, and found evidence of monopolistic 
competition. If distinction is made between various banking sizes, in order to capture different 
geographic markets, perfect collusion cannot be excluded for small banks or local markets in 
Australia and Greece, whereas, for a number of markets of various banking sizes in other 
countries perfect competition can not be excluded. Competition is stronger for large banks (which 
operate more in international markets) and weaker for small banks (which operate more on local 
markets), which is consistent with the results presented by De Bandt and Davis (2000). 
Furthermore, competition seems to be weaker in non-European countries. Claessens and Laeven 
(2003), using bank-level data, estimated the competitive conditions of the banking systems in 50 
countries. The H-statistic varies generally between 0.60 to 0.80, suggesting that monopolistic 
competition is the best description of the degree of competition. There does not appear to be any 
strong pattern among the countries, although it is interesting that some of the largest countries (in 
terms of number of banks and general size of their economy) have relatively low values for the 
H-statistics.  
A substantial part of the literature has focused on Asian banking systems. Lloyd-
Williams et.al. (1991) test for evidence of contestability on a sample of 72 Japanese commercial 
banks for 1986 and 1988. They find that the 1996 values of H range between -0.004 and -0.006, 
making them unable to reject the monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly 
hypotheses. However, for 1988 the values of H range between 0.245 and 0.423, suggesting that 
Japanese commercial banking revenues behaved as if earned under monopolistic competition. 
The results are consistent with the lack of entry by domestic institutions into commercial banking   18
being a result of incumbent firms acting in a contestable manner. According to Jiang et.al. (2004), 
the banking industry in Hong Kong can be characterized by close to perfect competition during 
the period 1992-2002. Smith and Tripe (2001) assesses competitive conditions in the New 
Zealand banking market in the period 1996-1999; he found that total bank revenues appear to 
have been earned under conditions of monopolistic competition. 
The Panzar and Rosse methodology has been extensively applied to European banking 
both on multi-country studies and single-country studies. Their results suggest that, in general, 
monopolistic competition is the proper characterisation of the conditions under which European 
banks have been operating.  
The first category (multi-country approach) includes studies presented by Molyneux et al. 
(1994), De Bandt and Davis (2000), Bikker and Groeneveld (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2000a,b), 
and Boutillier et al. (2004). Particularly, Molyneux et al. (1994) tested a sample of French, 
German, Italian, Spanish and British firms for the period 1986-1989. The results suggest that 
banks in Germany (except for 1987), the United Kingdom, France and Spain earned revenues as 
if under conditions of monopolistic competition in the examined period. Actually, the authors 
apply the same model to four separate years and find rather unstable results. For example, the 
market structure faced by banks in the UK shifted from monopoly to almost perfect competition 
and backward. In the case of German banks, the H-statistic switched sign between 1986 and 1989 
(-0.0363 in 1986; 0.4697 in 1989). The H-statistic for Italy during 1987-1989 is negative and 
significantly different from zero (-0.2578 and -0.8945 for 1987 and 1989 respectively). We are, 
therefore, unable to reject the monopoly or conjectural variations short-run oligopoly hypotheses 
for Italian commercial banks in these two years (the 1988 results for Italy also suggest this 
conclusion, although the data does not represent long-run equilibrium values)
14. Finally, long-run 
equilibrium tests illustrate that for the majority of the regressions the data are in long-run 
equilibrium and, therefore, the H-statistics can be meaningfully interpreted. 
De Bandt and Davis (2000) also estimated the H-statistic for France, Germany, and Italy, 
but for a later period (1992-1996), while they also included US in their sample for comparative 
purposes. Moreover, they estimated the H-statistic within groups of large and small banks in each 
country. Their econometric estimates indicate that the US exhibits a higher level of competition 
than the EU banking markets, though the hypothesis of perfect competition for the US market is 
still rejected. Within the EU, whereas Germany and France tend to show monopolistic 
competition for large banks and monopoly for small ones, in Italy there is evidence of 
                                                 
14 However, Coccorese (1998) evaluated the degree of competition in the Italian banking sector and 
obtained quite non-negative and significant values for H, except in 1992 and 1994.   19
monopolistic competition for both small and large banks. Furthermore, the behavior of large 
banks was not fully competitive as compared to the US. The authors do not find a clear trend in 
the competitive conditions in the economies studied. 
In their study of the competitive structure of the European Union banking industry as a 
whole as well as for individual EU countries, Bikker and Groeneveld (2000) estimated the H-
statistic and found that the European banking market as a whole is characterised by monopolistic 
competition. In spite of the deregulation and liberalisation of the EU bank market over the 
examined period (1989-1996), they found hardly any evidence of increasing competition over the 
years. Moreover, the hypothesis of a single European banking industry was strongly rejected. The 
authors also applied the analysis to the banking sectors of all individual EU countries separately, 
and found that H appears to be high, between two-third and one, in most countries. Only for two 
smaller countries (Denmark and Ireland) lower values for H are observed. The H=0 hypothesis is 
rejected for all countries. On the other hand, the hypothesis of perfect competition (H=1) cannot 
be rejected for two countries only, i.e. Belgium and Greece. Hence, the authors conclude that the 
banking industry market in separate EU countries can generally be classified as monopolistic 
competition, much closer to perfect competition than to monopoly.  
In a more recent study, Boutillier et.al. (2004), aiming to estimate the impact of EMU on 
the European banking sectors’ structure, analyse the degree of competition among bank firms of 
the four major European continental banking sectors (Germany, France, Italy and Spain) between 
1993 and 2000. The implementation of the Panzar and Rosse model allows rejecting the 
monopolistic competition hypothesis for any of the represented sector for the examined period. 
On the whole, this index shows how the high degree of competition persists within the European 
Union during the concerned period. 
The second category of studies at the European banking landscape includes the 
investigation of competitive conditions in individual EU countries (Vesala, 1995; Mooslechner 
and Schnitzer, 1995; Rime, 1999; Hondroyiannis et.al., 1999; Hempell, 2002, Coccorese, 1998, 
2004). For example, Vesala (1995) assesses the levels of competition in Finnish banks between 
1985 and 1992. A substantial increase in the level of contestability of Finnish banking was 
observable over the sample period, with the H statistic estimates rising from 0.182 in 1985 to 
0.620 in 1992. Particularly, Vesala found monopolistic competition for the periods 1985-1988 
and 1991-1992, and perfect competition for 1989-1990. This increase in contestability coincided 
with the substantial re-regulation of the Finnish banking sector in 1986.  
Hondroyiannis et.al. (1999) examines the Greek banking system over the period 1993-
1995. The results indicate that bank revenues appear to be earned in conditions of monopolistic   20
competition. Hempell (2002) investigated the German banking system for the period 1993-1998. 
He estimated the H-statistic separately for savings and cooperative banks and found that 
cooperative banks, which make up the largest part of the overall sample, attain the lowest H-
statistic (0.53). He observed H-statistic of 0.64 for savings banks, 0.80 for credit banks and 0.83 
for foreign banks. 
Coccorese (2004) has tried to assess the competitive conditions in the Italian banking 
industry during the period 1997-1999, taking into account both the whole nation and its main 
macro-areas. The empirical results confirm that Italian banks earn revenues as if they were under 
conditions of monopolistic competition. They also show that there is a positive relationship 
between the local economic performance and the degree of competition among banks, given that 
they appear to behave as perfectly competitive firms where local macroeconomic data reveal 
lower unemployment rates, greater per capita GDP and lower market loan rates. 
Finally, a growing part of the more recent literature has focused on emerging economies. 
Spiller and Favaro (1984) considered the form of competition that was present in the Uruguayan 
banking sector. The analysis suggested that banking firms do not have the same conjectures, or 
respond differently to actions of other banking firms within the same market. Gelfand and Spiller 
(1987) examined the same market between 1977-1980 and suggested that the removal of entry 
barriers for foreign banks reduced the degree of oligopolistic rivalty occurring between banks and 
eventually, leading to an increase in the level of competition in the domestic banking market. 
Barajas et.al. (2000) found monopolistic competition for the Colombian banking system in the 
period 1985-1998, with domestic banks exhibiting a considerably lower degree of competition 
(H=0.265) than established foreign banks (H=0.527).  
 Yildirim and Philippatos (2002) analyze the evolution of competitive conditions in the 
banking industries of fourteen Central and Eastern European transition economies for the period 
1993-2000. The results suggest that the banking markets of these countries cannot be 
characterized by the bipolar cases of either perfect competition or monopoly except for FYR of 
Macedonia and Slovakia (for the overall sample, the mean levels of H values range from 0.46 to 
0.58 depending on the model specification and are significantly different from both zero and 
unity). Furthermore, the cross-sectional analysis of competitive structure reveals initially a 
decreasing trend between 1993 and 1996 and a subsequent increasing trend in competitive 
conditions after 1996. Large banks in transition countries operate in a relatively more competitive 
environment compared to small banks, or in other words, competition is lower in local markets 
compared to national and international markets.   21
Drakos and Konstantinou (2003) have evaluated competitive conditions in banking 
markets for the period 1992-2000 and focused on a sample of banks from a group of Central and 
Eastern European countries or Former Soviet Union countries. They found overwhelming 
evidence against both the hypotheses of perfect competition and monopoly for all countries, 
except for Latvia, where the banking sector might even be consistent with a monopoly structure. 
Similarly, when pooling all available information in the panel, they noted that transition banking 
as a whole is consistent with a monopolistically competitive market structure.  
Yeyati and Micco (2003) examine concentration and foreign penetration in eight Latin 
American banking sectors (those of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Mexico and Peru) in the period 1993-2002. They conclude that the perfect competition (H=1) and 
monopoly (H=0) hypotheses are rejected at conventional levels for all countries. Moreover, their 
estimates of H for Latin American countries do not differ in range and cross-country variability 
for those found in more developed countries. Belaisch (2003) found that Brazilian banks operate 
under conditions of oligopoly over the period 1997-2000. 
Finally, Gelos and Roldos (2004) investigated the competitive conditions of a sample of 
Latin America and Central and Eastern European countries over the period 1994-1999. The H-
statistics are always between zero and one, indicating monopolistic competition for all but two 
countries, Argentina and Hungary, where the H statistic is compatible with either monopolistic or 
perfect competition. Over the examined period market structure changed in only one of the eight 
emerging markets examined (for Turkey, we cannot reject a decline in the H statistic, suggesting 
that competition has become less intense since 1998), with constancy of the H statistic in the 
other cases. 
 
4. Empirical  model 
 
As we have already mentioned, traditional indicators of market structure rely on the 
indirect influences of market concentration and market power. Therefore we conduct an empirical 
analysis based on the Panzar and Rosse methodology to directly assess competitive conditions in 
the new EU banking system.  
We rely on the intermediation approach of a bank
15, initially developed by Klein (1971) 
and Sealey and Lindley (1977). To derive the H statistic we use the following specification of the 
                                                 
15 As discussed in Colwell and Davis (1992) there are two principal approaches to bank output 
measurement. In the “production approach” banks are treated as firms that use capital and labor to produce 
different categories of loan and deposit account. Output is measured by number of accounts or related 
transactions, and total costs are all operating costs used to produce these outputs. In the “intermediation   22
reduced-form revenue equation estimated to run on a panel data set of banks, similar to those 
presented in previous studies cited above: 
ln INTR = a + b ln wF + c ln wL + d ln wC + e ln BSF + g ln (OI/A)  (1) 
where INTR: the ratio of interest revenue (or total and organic revenue) to total assets
16, wF: the 
unit price of funds, wL: the unit price of labour, wC: the unit price of capital, BSF: bank specific 
factors and OI/A: the ratio of other income to total assets. 
Under the Panzar-Rosse framework, the H statistic is equal to the sum of the elasticities 
of the interest (or other) revenue with respect to the three input prices, i.e. H = b + c + d. In this 
paper, as does Bikker and Haaf (2000a,b), we interpret H as a continuous measure of the level of 
competition, in particular between 0 and 1, in the sense that higher values of H indicate stronger 
competition than lower values. This does not follow automatically from Panzar-Rosse (1987), 
which concentrates only on the testing of the hypotheses H=0 (or more precise (H≤0) and H=1. 
However, it can be shown that under stronger assumptions (in particular a constant price elasticity 
of demand across bank-size markets and countries) our continuous interpretation of H and the 
comparison between countries or bank-size markets is correct. The log specification may reduce 
possible simultaneity bias. 
The nature of the estimation of the H-statistic means that we are especially interested in 
understanding how interest revenues (or organic and total revenues) react to variations in the cost 
figures. Since financial intermediation constitutes the core business in commercial banking, we 
first consider the ratio of interest revenues to total assets as the dependent variable. Although 
interest revenues still constitute the principal source of banks’ earnings, recent studies on banking 
activities report an increasing share of non-interest income from fee-based products and services 
and off balance sheet credit substitutes in total revenues. Therefore we complement our analysis 
by using the ratio of total operating income to total assets (calculated as the interest revenue plus 
all the other non-interest income) as a dependent variable, which arguable makes it a more 
comprehensive measure of the overall degree of competition in banking services. In other words, 
in our approach banks are either seen as firms producing loans and investments (in the interest 
revenue approach) or loans, investments and other services (in the total revenue approach)
17. 
Moreover, due to the fact that during the examined period banks increasingly focused on their 
traditional retail operations owing to the continued retrenchment of investors from equity markets 
                                                                                                                                                 
approach”, banks are viewed as intermediators of financial services rather than producers of loans and 
deposit account services, and the value of loans and investments are used as output measures; labor and 
capital are inputs to this process and hence operating costs plus interest costs are the relevant cost measure.  
16 The dependent variable is divided with total assets in order to abstract from size effects. 
17 From a comparative perspective, the existence of accounting differences across countries is an additional 
argument in favor of having a comprehensive view of bank revenues.   23
towards safer investments, we also use the ratio of organic income (interest income plus fee and 
commission income) to total assets as an alternative dependent variable. On the whole, in terms 
of dependent variables, we estimate three different models.  
We assume that banks use three inputs (i.e. funds, labour, and capital), which is 
consistent with the intermediation approach. The ratio of interest expenses to total funds is used 
as a proxy for the price of funds, while the ratio of other expenses (operating costs minus those 
expenses related to funds and labour) to fixed assets is used as a proxy for the unit price of 
capital
18. For the price of labour we use two alternative specifications: the ratio of personnel 
expenses to total assets (like Molyneux et.al., 1994; Bikker and Groeneveld, 2000; and Bikker 
and Haaf, 2000a,b), or, alternatively, the ratio of personnel expenses to the sum of loans and 
deposits
19. The ratio of personnel expenses to the number of employees, which is a cleaner 
measure of unit labor costs, could also be a plausible alternative (Shaffer, 1982; Nathan and 
Neave, 1989; Hondroyiannis et.al., 1999; Coccorese, 2004). However, the former proxy is only 
available for a small subset of our sample of observations
20, and therefore we exclude this 
variable from the analysis.  
As far as the independent variables are concerned (apart from the input prices), we 
include a set of bank-specific variables that reflect differences in risks, banks’ production 
function, and deposit mix, to allow for bank heterogeneity. These variables, which should, at least 
theoretically, descend from the marginal revenue and cost functions underlying the empirical 
Panzar-Rosse equation, are the ratio of loans to total assets, the ratio of equity to total assets, the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to loans, and the ratio of bank deposits to customer and short-term 
funding,  the latter to account for differences in deposit mix. All variables are expressed in 
logarithmic form. We also include the ratio of other income to total assets to account for the 
influence of the generation of other income on the model’s underlying marginal revenue and cost 
functions
21.  
A positive coefficient for loans to total assets is expected, as a higher fraction of loans on 
the total assets envisages greater revenue, whereas the coefficient for the other income to the total 
                                                 
18 Nathan and Neave (1989) and Coccorese (1998) calculate this proxy dividing the general costs by the 
number of branches. However the database does not provide adequate figures regarding the number of 
branch of the European financial institutions. 
19 We assume that deposit collection and loan distribution are the most labour intensive operations, and 
therefore the ratio of personnel expenses to loans and deposits can provide a reasonable proxy for staff 
numbers. These results are not presented in the paper, but are available upon request from the authors. 
20 Moreover, empirical evidence have shown that results based on the ratio of personnel expenses to the 
number of employees are rather similar to those based on the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets 
(Hondroyiannis et.al., 1999; Coccorese, 2004). 
21 This ratio is used as an explanatory variable when the dependent variable is interest revenue (or organic 
income); not in the case of total operating revenues.   24
balance sheet ratio is probably negative as the generation of other income may be at the expense 
of interest income. The coefficient of the equity to total assets ratio will be negative or positive 
according to whether a higher level of risk capital leads to lower or higher bank revenues 
(Coccorese, 2004). Molyneux et.al. (1994) expect a negative coefficient for equity to total assets, 
because less equity implies more leverage and hence more interest income (see also Bikker and 
Groeneveld, 1998). However, on the other hand, capital requirements are higher, the riskier the 
loan and investment portfolios are, suggesting a positive coefficient. We expect the provisions to 
total assets ratio to be positively correlated to the dependent variables, since higher provisions 
should lead to higher bank revenue (Hondroyiannis et.al., 1999).   
Equation (1) is estimated for EU-15 and new EU countries on aggregate and separately to 
investigate whether there are differences in competitive conditions between old and new EU 
countries. Additionally, we apply the Panzar and Rosse approach in the major EU countries, i.e. 
Germany, France, the UK, Italy and Spain, as well as for different size classes (at least for the old 
EU banking system, since large banks do not exist in the new EU banking sectors). 
Banks were divided into three size-classes according to the size of their balance sheet. 
The threshold differentiating medium-sized from large banks is set at 50 billion euros, while the 
threshold between small and medium-sized banks is set at 5 billion euros
22. A bank is classified as 
large if it has total assets above 50 billion euros for the majority of the five-year sample period 
(1998-2002), as medium-sized if it has assets between 5 and 50 billion euros (for at least three 
years out of the five-year period), and as small if it has assets below 5 billion euros. The large 
bank sample is relatively small to ensure that only truly large banks are included. Large banks 
represent almost 3% of all banks in the EU-15 as a whole, while no financial institution with total 
assets above 50 billion euros is operating in any of the new EU countries. Medium-sized banks 
represent 10% and 7% in EU-15 and new EU countries respectively, while the majority of banks 
is classified as small (87% for EU-15 and 93% for new EU countries). It should be noted, 
however, that in order to derive an accurate estimate of H-statistic for each size-category, we 
need a reasonable number of bank-year observations. Hence, as the number of medium-sized 
banks in the ten new EU countries is very small (and we have only 37 observations), we restrict 
our analysis of competition between different size-classes only to the old EU-15 countries. We 
expect smaller banks to operate in a less competitive environment than larger banks, or, put 
                                                 
22 Bikker and Haaf (2000a,b) split their sample based on total assets of the banks: the smallest 50% of all 
banks of the world-wide sample constitute the small-banks’ sample, the largest 10% of all banks constitute 
the large-bank sample, whereas remainders form the medium-sized sample.   25
differently, local markets to be less competitive than national and international markets (like 
Bikker and Haaf, 2000b). 
Finally, as noted earlier, one critical assumption of the Panzar-Rosse approach is that 
banking systems operate in their long-run equilibrium, and therefore in order to confirm that the 
H-statistic we have estimated provides useful results, we need to verify that this conditions holds. 
As suggested by different authors (Shaffer, 1982; Molyneux et.al., 1994; Cocorrese, 2004 et.al.), 
one should verify that input prices are not correlated with industry returns. The empirical test for 
the market equilibrium is justified on the grounds that competitive capital markets will equalize 
risk-adjusted rate of returns across banks such that, in equilibrium, rates of return should not be 
correlated statistically with input prices. However, if the market is in disequilibrium, an increase 
(decrease) in factor prices would be reflected in a temporary decline (increase) in the rate of 
return. This is especially important for the cases of perfect competition and monopolistic 
competition (H>0), while the rejection of the monopoly hypothesis remains valid even if the 
sample is not in long-run equilibrium (Shaffer 1995, 2004). The long-run equilibrium test for the 
value of H is performed by running the same equation (1), however, using the return on assets 
(ROA) [or the return on equity (ROE)] as the dependent variable instead of revenues. In that 
framework, H=0 indicates that banking systems are in equilibrium. However, it should be noticed 
that equilibrium does not mean that competitive conditions are not allowed to change rather that 
changes in banking are taken as gradual.  
 
5.  Data analysis and descriptive statistics 
 
Bank-level data were obtained from the BankScope database provided by Fitch-IBCA, a 
London-based rating agency for all the twenty-five EU countries. Accounting information are 
from the full spreadsheet and raw data files. This source provides consolidated data for the period 
1996-2002. However, since the availability of data for early years (i.e. 1996 and 1997) is short, 
we work with an unbalanced sample covering all the EU banking industries during the period 
1998-2002. The main objective in choosing the particular sample period and their respective data 
is to utilise the most recent year-end financial data that are available in the new European 
economic and monetary environment that has been created. One advantage of the Fitch IBCA 
database is that it offers annual balance sheet and income statement data that are reasonably 
comparable across countries and therefore suitable for cross-country comparisons.  
However, a feature of the Fitch IBCA database that can be considered as a shortcoming is 
that coverage has expanded over time and therefore it does not provide a complete historical   26
panel of banks over time (also mentioned by Gelos and Roldos, 2004). This becomes even more 
apparent in the case of mergers, as only the largest of the merged banks is typically kept in the 
database, as well as in the case of bank failures, since exiting banks are fully deleted from the 
database (De Bandt and Davis, 2000). Another possible source of bias stems from the fact that 
only the more prominent banks are included in the database, excluding smaller ones which 
potentially might have more market power in local markets. The latter bias is more pronounced 
for small banks since the coverage of medium and large banks is relatively satisfactory in the 
database. This is a problem that we, as other authors, cannot address. Finally, some of the banks 
that are recorded in the database report only partial information and there are frequently missing 
observations for some variables, such as the number of bank employees.  
The data were reviewed for reporting errors and other inconsistencies. In some cases 
observations were dropped from the sample. Starting from a large dataset of banks, we arrive, 
after removal of outliers, at an unbalanced sample of 3,031 banks in 1998 for all the countries 
under investigation, 3,032 in 1999, 3,230 in 2000, 3,334 in 2001 and 3,166 in 2002, which 
comprises a very large portion of the banking industries in these countries (in terms of balance 
sheet aggregates). In the database, year 2001 presents the highest financial institutions’ coverage. 
The sample covers 2,886 banks from the old EU countries in 1998 (EU-15 countries), 2,891 in 
1999, 3,090 in 2000, 3,187 in 2001 and 3,046 in 2002 (the aggregate figures for the 10 new EU 
countries are 145, 141, 140, 147, and 120 respectively). Table 4 lists the number of banks in the 
sample by country and financial year.  
 
Table 4: Number of banks in the sample 
  Year 
Country 1998 1999 2000 2001  2002
Austria 21 136 163 178  36
Belgium 45 42 42 45  32
Denmark 84 79 83 81  79
Finland 7 6 6 9  5
France 250 253 246 246  250
Germany 1,435 1,308 1,477 1,500  1,513
Greece 11 16 15 17  19
Ireland 36 40 36 38  33
Italy 558 579 589 576  595
Luxembourg 67 51 60 50  45
Netherlands 47 46 36 42  42
Portugal 23 25 28 30  26
Spain 104 112 110 104  111
Sweden 13 18 20 94  90
UK 185 180 179 177  170
EU-15 2,886 2,891 3,090 3,187  3,046  27
Cyprus 17 14 13 14  13
Czech Republic  17 16 18 17  11
Estonia 5 5 5 5  3
Hungary 23 25 21 22  22
Latvia 13 15 14 17  9
Lithuania 7 9 8 9  7
Malta 6 7 6 7  4
Poland 29 28 32 31  28
Slovakia 13 8 9 10  8
Slovenia 15 14 14 15  15
new EU countries  145 141 140 147  120
EU-25 3,031 3,032 3,230 3,334  3,166
Source: Fitch-IBCA database and own estimations. 
 
Annex 2 provides some summary statistics for the 25 banking sectors under investigation 
for the whole period 1998-2002. It shows that on average, the financial institution in Finland is 
the largest one among all the EU countries, while at the other end stands Italy. For the 10 new EU 
countries, the average bank in Czech Republic is the largest, and the smallest is located in Latvia, 
whereas the largest and the smallest banks are operating in Poland. Generally, the banking sectors 
in the old 15 EU countries are dominated by larger financial institutions than those of the new EU 
countries. 
Loans dominate the aggregate balance sheet figures on the assets’ size of the financial 
reports. For the 15 EU countries, the average ratio is the highest in the case of Sweden (73%) and 
the lowest in Luxembourg (28%). On the other hand, for the 10 new EU countries, Slovenia has 
the highest average ratio (53%), while Czech Republic has the lowest (37%). Moreover, it is 
worth mentioning that in half of the 10 new EU countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia and 
Czech Republic) the average level of this ratio stands at levels below 50%, something that occurs 
only in three of the old EU countries (Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg). On average, the loan 
to assets ratio is higher in the EU-15 banking sector (59%) than in the 10 new EU countries 
(48%)
23.  
The average ratio of equity to total assets in the EU-15 countries ranges from 6 to 10% 
for the majority of the countries, except of Germany (5.3%) and Denmark, Italy, Sweden and 
Greece (with ratios of 13.6%, 12.3%, 11.7%, and 11.4% respectively). On the other hand, this 
ratio is much higher for the 10 new EU countries; it ranges, on average, from 7.8% in Czech 
Republic to 13.3% in Lithuania. This should be expected considering the ongoing restructuring 
process of these banking sectors, and the crises some of them have experienced recently. 
                                                 
23 This is consistent with the ECB Report (July, 2002) mentioning the relatively low level of financial 
intermediation in the 10 new EU countries (at that point of time accession countries).   28
Annex 2 shows that the bank in Denmark relies much more heavily, on average, on 
interest income (as presented by the interest income to total assets ratio [interest margin ratio] 
which stands at 6.8%), while Finland is at the other end of the spectrum (at 3.7%). The average 
ratio for EU-15 banking sector as a whole is 5.8%. Regarding the new EU countries, Poland has 
the highest and Malta the lowest interest margin ratio. On average, the examined ratio ranges 
from 6 to 11% in the new countries, and is much higher than that of the old EU countries (on 
average it stands at 8.7%). This indicates that banks in new EU countries relay more on interest 
income than other sources of income such as fee or commission income (maybe because capital 
markets are less developed in those countries), compared with the old EU countries. Similar is the 
picture we obtain when we examine the ratio of total revenue to assets.  
  On average, the financial institution in EU-15 countries presents lower personnel 
expenses to assets (1.4%) compared with the new countries (1.7%). Denmark and Ireland are at 
the two edges of the personnel costs’ range (high and low) regarding the EU-15 countries, while 
Lithuania and Slovakia are those respectively among the 10 new EU countries.  
 
6. Empirical  Results 
 
Following the empirical literature on banking competition, we estimate the reduced-form 
revenue equation (Equation (1)) on a panel data framework, which effectively utilizes 
information both from the cross-section of banks as well as their time series behavior
24. The 
regression models are estimated using the fixed effects estimator in order to control for 
unobserved heterogeneity, which is especially important since the regressions are otherwise likely 
to suffer from omitted variable problems. Our choice of the fixed effects estimators versus the 
random effects model is confirmed by the implementation of the Hausman test -and is further 
supported by the vast majority of the literature- which indicated that the p-value of chi-square 
obtained is very low and therefore the hypothesis of no correlation between the error and the 
regressors (under which, the random effects model is applicable) is rejected. We introduce 
therefore in Equation (1) different intercepts (α=αi , i = 1,… N) in order to capture all bank-
specific, non time-varying determinants of revenues not explicitly addressed in the regression 
specification, as well as time dummies to take into account time effects (Annex 3). However, 
when we performed a modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity in the residuals of 
the fixed effects model (following Greene, 2000: p. 598), the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity 
                                                 
24 For the advantages of utilizing panel data see De Bandt and Davis (2000).   29
was firmly rejected
25. Therefore, in order to correct for heteroscedasticity, the regression models 
are re-estimated by implementing the ordinary least squares (OLS) method using panel corrected 
standard errors. Country dummies were added in the estimations to take into account country-
specific characteristics that were omitted from the regression specification, while we also 
included time dummies. These constitute our core results and will be presented in the following 
section. 
   Overall, the point estimate of the H-statistic is significantly positive in every instance, 
independently of the dependent variable we use (i.e. interest revenue, organic income or total 
operating income), rejecting the hypotheses of monopoly or consistent conjectural variations 
short-run oligopoly. At the same time, it is significantly less than unity, rejecting the hypothesis 
of perfect competition. Hence, our evidence indicate the existence of a certain degree of 
monopolistic competition in the new European banking landscape, which is consistent with the 
findings of previous studies applying the same methodology. 
  
a)   Results for EU-15 and new EU countries 
Tables 5 to 7 report pooled regression results for the old EU (EU-15) and the new EU 
countries over the sample period 1998-2002. With interest income as the dependent variable 
(Table 5), the H-statistic is estimated at 0.54 and 0.78 for old and new EU countries respectively. 
The Wald tests reveal that H differs significantly from both 0 and 1, and therefore reject the 
hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition for EU-15 as well as for new EU countries 
at the 1% significance level, leading us to conclude that interest revenue appear to be earned 
under conditions of monopolistic competition during the sample periods. As we already 
mentioned in the specification of the model, under strong assumptions (and particularly by 
assuming a constant elasticity of demand across markets) the comparison of H between countries 
is correct (Vesala, 1995; Bikker and Haaf, 2000b; and Coccorese, 2004). Hence, we can conclude 
that, on aggregate, the banking systems in the new EU countries operate in a more competitive 
environment that those of the old EU countries. Lower barriers to entry in the examined period, 
such as allowing increased participation of foreign banks in the new EU banking sectors, appear 
                                                 
25 For the interest income equation, the values of the modified Wald statistic for group-wise 
heteroscedasticity (it follows the chi-distribution) are (the number in parentheses are the p-values): for EU-
15=4.4e
+33 (0.000), for new EU = 2.7e
+30 (0.000), for France = 2.0e
+32 (0.000), for Germany = 1.7e
+33 
(0.000), for Italy = 2.2e
+32(0.000), for Spain = 5.2e
+30 (0.000), and for the UK = 2.3e
+31 (0.000). For the 
organic income equation, the values are: for EU-15 = 6.2e
+33 (0.000), for new EU = 5.2e
+30 (0.000), for 
France = 4.2e
+33 (0.000), for Germany = 2.5e
+33 (0.000), for Italy = 1.1e
+35 (0.000), for Spain = 1.3e
+32 
(0.000), and for the UK = 1.6e
+32 (0.000). For the total operating revenues equation, the values are: for EU-
15 = 3.5e
+34 (0.000), for new EU = 5.6e
+31 (0.000), for France = 1.3e
+32 (0.000), for Germany = 2.9e
+33 
(0.000), for Italy = 5.7e
+31 (0.000), for Spain = 1.2e
+33 (0.000), and for the UK = 37650.40 (0.000).   30
to have prevented a decline in competitive pressures at least in the main income source, i.e. the 
interest income
26. (see also Gelos and Roldos, 2004).  
The higher competition facing the new EU countries can be further confirmed when 
looking at the estimation results with organic income as the dependent variable (Table 6). The H-
statistic for EU-15 banking systems is estimated at 0.65, while the respective statistic for new EU 
countries is at 0.73. Formal tests reveal again that H differs significantly from both 0 and 1, 
providing evidence that a certain degree of monopolistic competition in these banking markets is 
present. However, it seems that the difference in the H-statistic between the two examined 
regions is reduced, since the competition for products and services gaining fee and commission 
income is higher in the old EU-15 countries. Confirming this trend, in our third specification, 
which uses the ratio of total operating revenues as the dependent variable (Table 7), our findings 
are reversed due mainly to the corresponding underdevelopment of capital markets in the new EU 
countries. EU-15 countries appear to have a higher H-statistic (estimated at 0.61) compared with 
the new EU countries (H is estimated at 0.46). Overall, our results for the EU-15 and the 10 new 
EU countries indicate that banks operate under conditions of monopolistic competition. 
Moreover, the point estimates of H obtained from the third specification were consistently lower 
than those of the first two specifications in the case of the new EU countries. 
As regards the overall pattern of signs, results (Tables 5-7) indicate that for both EU-15 
and new EU countries the price of labour is always positive and statistically significant, either 
when measured as the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets or as the ratio of personnel 
expenses to loans and deposits
27. This is consistent with the findings of previous studies (i.e. 
Molyneux et al., 1994; Bikker and Groeneveld, 1998; Hondroyiannis et al., 1999; Bikker and 
Haaf, 2000b; Yeyati and Micco, 2002; Gelos and Roldos, 2004; Coccorese, 2004). Moreover, its 
coefficient becomes higher and more significant as we move from the measurement of interest 
income to total operating revenues. The coefficient of the price of funds is positive and 
statistically significant when we use as a dependent variable either interest or organic income. 
However, when the ratio of total operating income to the balance sheet aggregates is used as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient becomes negative for EU-15 countries (and significant at the 
5% level), while it remain positive but statistically insignificant for the new EU countries. In 
particular, an interesting result is that, in contrast to the unit price of labour, which follows the 
exact opposite pattern, the elasticity of the price of funds is reduced both in magnitude as well as 
                                                 
26 In the descriptive statistics we mentioned the high level of interest income that these 10 new countries 
present in the examined period. 
27 Results available from the authors upon request.   31
in statistical importance, as we move from interest (or organic) income to the use of total 
operating income. Overall, in our first two specifications (with interest and organic income), the 
price of funds contributes the most to the explanation of bank revenue (which is hardly surprising 
given the fact that funding is the main factor in the production function of banks), followed by the 
price of labour. However, in the case of total operating income results are reversed. Nevertheless, 
in any case, the effect of the price of capital on the overall elasticity appears to be minimal 
compared to other input prices, while its sign is always positive. Our results are consistent with 
other studies that find that the sign of the coefficient on the unit price of capital varies by 
economies and, in most cases, is negligible in the overall factor price elasticity (Jiang et.al., 
2004).  
As far as the other control variables is concerned, the ratio of loans to total assets always 
has the expected positive and significant sign, and is the most important bank-specific factor, both 
in terms of occurrence and level of significance. Moreover, the ratio of bank deposits to customer 
and short-term funding is consistently negative and significant (except of the case when we use 
total operating revenues when it becomes insignificant). The ratio of loan loss provisions to total 
loans is always positive, and statistically significant for the EU-15 and new EU countries. Finally, 
as far as the sign of the ratio of equity to total assets is concerned, results are mixed; the 
coefficient is always positive and significant in the old EU countries and negative and, most of 
the times, significant, in the new EU countries. As we have mentioned, Molyneux et.al. (1994) 
expect a negative coefficient for equity to total assets, because less equity implies more leverage 
and hence more interest income (see also Bikker and Groeneveld, 1998). However, on the other 
hand, capital requirements are higher, the riskier the loan and investment portfolios are, 
suggesting a positive coefficient. Moreover, the negative coefficient in the case of new EU 
countries may reflect the payoff of other expenses, such as costs on rationalisation of branch 
networks and information technology, something that can only be effective in improving 
efficiency and in turn increasing revenue in the longer term. Finally, the sign of the coefficient of 
other income to total assets is always negative and significant, as expected.    
As elaborated in the literature, a critical feature of the H-statistic is that the test must be 
undertaken on observations that are in a long-run equilibrium. An equilibrium test is provided for 
all three models, after replacement of the dependent variable by the rate of return on average 
assets (ROA) or equity (ROE). Using both alternative specifications (ROA and ROE), we find 
that the hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) is confirmed for both EU-15 and new EU countries. The 
Wald tests performed could not reject the hypothesis of equilibrium at conventional statistical 
levels, which means that our analysis is well established (Annex 4).    32
b)   Results for individual countries 
Tables 8 to 10 examine the competitive conditions in the five largest European banking 
markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK). For Germany, with the ratio of interest 
income to total assets as the dependent variable, all three input prices are positive and statistically 
significant, with the price of funds contributing more to the explanation of banks’ interest 
revenues. The H-statistic is estimated at 0.394 and is statistically different from both zero and 
unity, indicating the existence of monopolistic competition. When we use organic income as the 
dependent variable, our results concerning the signs and the significance of coefficients do not 
change substantially, but the H-statistic is calculated at higher levels (at 0.597); again the German 
banking market is characterized by monopolistic competition. As far as the third specification is 
concerned, the price of labour has the highest coefficient followed by the price of capital, while 
the price of funds becomes negative, but remains statistically significant (as also reported for the 
whole EU-15 banking industry). The H-statistic is estimated at 0.520. Overall, our results for 
Germany are consistent with previous studies conducted for that country
28. All other bank 
specific variables are also statistically significant, with the expected sign.   
  For France, as in Germany, the three input coefficients are positive and statistically 
significant, with the funding price having the higher coefficient among all input prices (with the 
exception of the specification with total revenues regarding the price of funds). The H-statistic, 
when the dependent variable is interest income, is estimated at 0.701, while when it is organic 
income or total revenues it is estimated at 0.826 and 0.829 respectively. In all cases both the 
hypotheses of monopoly and perfect competition are rejected. For the third specification, as is the 
case in all other countries, the price of labour contributes the most to the explanation of total 
operating income, followed by the price of capital, while the price of funds is negative but not 
statistically significant. The explanatory variables have the expected signs. Our results for France 
are consistent with previous research on that country (e.g. Glassens and Laeven, 2003).  
  For the United Kingdom, the H-statistic, when we use interest income as the dependent 
variable, is estimated at 0.670. The hypotheses of both monopoly and perfect competition are 
rejected, indicating that banks earn their interest revenues under conditions of monopolistic 
competition. When we use organic income, the H-statistic improves slightly, standing at 0.740, 
while, with total operating income, the H-statistic is estimated at somewhat lower levels, 
compared with the previous two specifications (0.604). Among input prices, the price of capital is 
                                                 
28 More specifically, Hempell (2002) estimated H-statistic at 0.68, De Bandt and Davis (2000) estimated H 
at 0.54 and 0.63, Bikker and Haaf (2000a,b) at 0.60 and 0.63, and Glassens and Laeven (2003) found that H 
ranges from 0.39 to 0.69 according to the model specification.   33
positive but insignificant in all specifications. Our results are consistent with previous studies, i.e. 
Bikker and Haaf (2000b) estimated H at 0.61 and 0.64 depending on model specification. 
  For the Spanish banking system, in all specifications the price of capital is not significant, 
while the other two variables have positive and significant signs (except of the price of funds in 
the third specification). The H-statistic, when the dependent variable is interest income, is 
estimated at 0.509, while when it is organic income or total revenues it is estimated at 0.619 and 
0.429 respectively. In all cases both the hypotheses of monopoly and perfect competition are 
rejected. The price of funds contributes the most to the explanation of interest revenues, while 
among the other explanatory variables, the equity to assets ratio has a negative sign (something 
that is not observed in the other EU countries). Finally, we present the results for the Italian 
banking system. The H-statistic, with interest income as the dependent variable, is estimated at 
0.665, while when organic income or total revenues is used, it is estimated at 0.781 and 0.561 
respectively.  
  Comparing the countries, it seems that France is the most competitive major European 
banking market, regardless of the dependent variable we use in the model. Germany is the least 
competitive market in the first two specifications, and Spain in the last one.  
As a final point, an important issue remains to be examined, and particularly, whether the 
banking systems we have investigated are in equilibrium. Using both alternative specifications 
(ROA and ROE), we find that the hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) is confirmed for all the major 
EU countries. The Wald tests performed could not reject the hypothesis of equilibrium at 
conventional statistical levels, which means that our analysis is well established (Annex 4).  
 
c)   Results for different size-classes 
  Next, we investigate whether the wide size dispersion of the banks considered in the 
sample has a significant impact on their competitive behavior (Tables 11 to 13). The purpose of 
this decomposition is to investigate whether differences in conduct patterns can be expected to 
arise with the size of the institutions.  
Some arguments can, a priori, be delivered favoring the case of lower conduct parameters 
for larger banks, evidencing stronger competition (Canhoro, 2004). This result is confirmed when 
interest revenue is used as the dependent variable. The H-statistic for large banks is 0.540, while 
for medium-sized and small the respective figures stand at 0.462 and 0.519. This may be due to 
the fact that smaller banks that operate in local markets experience a certain degree of market 
power in interest pricing (and thus should face less competition).  However, in all cases, both 
hypotheses of monopoly and perfect competition are rejected, indicating that banks of all size-  34
categories earn their interest revenues under conditions of monopolistic competition. In contrast 
to the first model, in the other two specifications (using organic income and total operating 
revenues), the H-statistic is higher for smaller banks. This finding may be attributed to the fierce 
competition these banks have to face in the field of commission generation and capital market 
related activities. 
As regards the signs of coefficients, the price of funds (as in our previous findings) 
contributes the most to the explanation of interest and organic income, followed by the price of 
labour. However, in the third specification (with total operating income as the dependent 
variable), the coefficient of the unit price of funds becomes negative for all size-classes of banks 
and remains significant only for large banks. On the other hand, the price of labour follows the 
opposite pattern. The ratio of loans to total assets is consistently positive and statistically 
significant.    
As a final point, we need to examine whether our data are in equilibrium. Using both 
alternative specifications (ROA and ROE), we find that the hypothesis of equilibrium (H=0) is 
confirmed for small and large banks at conventional statistical levels. However, the Wald test for 
medium-sized banks indicated that H is significantly different from zero (and particularly 
negative), and therefore the hypothesis of equilibrium was rejected at 1% level of significance. 
(Annex 4). The implication of a negative H (in equilibrium test) is that an exogenous increase in 
input prices reduces the bank’s ROA, which means that the bank is unable to pass along its higher 
costs fully to its borrowers without losing some patronage (Shaffer, 2004). According to Shaffer 
(2004), the main inference of these disequilibrium findings is that the rejection of H=1 might be 
spurious for medium-sized banks. However, the rejection of H=0 in the revenue equations 
remains valid even if the sample is not in long-run equilibrium.   
 
7. Conclusion 
  There are many different views on the desirability of different banking structures in 
which banks operate. Competitive conditions in the banking industry and their evolution over 
time are of interest to policy makers responsible for monetary and financial stability. While 
competition could lower financial intermediation costs and contribute to improvement in 
economic efficiency, it could reduce market power and profitability of banks, weakening their 
ability to withstand adverse developments. 
In this paper we try to assess the current market structure of the banking industry in the 
new EU landscape, and to record the degree of competition. The paper measures the degree of 
concentration and competition in the new enlarged European banking environment and   35
investigate competitive conditions in the major European banking markets over the period 1998-
2002. We describe the patterns of consolidation and concentration using traditional indicators of 
market structure. As these indicators rely on the indirect inferences of market concentration and 
market power, we conduct an empirical analysis based on the method developed by Panzar and 
Rosse to assess changes in the competitive structure in EU markets (aggregate and major 
individual) following the consolidation process in the examined period. In the Panzar and Rosse 
methodology the key point is that a monopolist’s output and total revenue decline when his 
marginal cost curve shifts upward. On the contrary, in a perfectly competitive sector, an increase 
in marginal costs would be fully reflected in prices, thus increasing total revenues one-to-one for 
the sector as a whole. In between these two extremes is the case of oligopolistic structure: as the 
marginal cost curve shifts upward, total revenues increase by less than one-to-one with the 
increase in costs.  
The trend of consolidation that has been observed over several years in the banking 
industry continued in most countries, and was mostly apparent in the declining number of credit 
institutions. At the country level, the pace of consolidation greatly varied, with large countries 
showing the most substantial decrease in the total number of institutions. Despite large-scale 
privatization and more liberal public policy towards the elimination of entry barriers, the banking 
sectors of the 10 new EU countries remained much more concentrated throughout the sample 
period than those of the EU-15 countries. Furthermore, what is observed is a slight reduction in 
concentration in the 10 new EU countries. This means that while the number of banks has fallen 
in these countries, this decline has not systematically resulted in an increase in concentration. 
The empirical study based on the Panzar-Rosse approach suggests that the point estimate 
of the H-statistic is significantly positive in every instance, independently of the dependent 
variable we use (i.e. interest revenue, organic income or total operating income), rejecting the 
hypotheses of monopoly or consistent conjectural variations short-run oligopoly. At the same 
time, it is significantly less than unity, rejecting the hypothesis of perfect competition. Hence, our 
evidence indicate the existence of a certain degree of monopolistic competition in the new 
European banking landscape (old EU-15 countries, major EU countries and 10 new countries), 
which is consistent with the findings of previous studies applying the same methodology. It 
should, however, be stressed that, as competition is dynamic in nature, conditions that observed 
over a certain period might not be indicative for another. Moreover, we can conclude that, on 
aggregate, the banking system in the new EU countries operate in a more competitive 
environment that that of the old EU countries at least when evaluating main income source, i.e. 
the interest income. When the dependent variable is total revenues, it seems that the old EU-15   36
banking system is more competitive than the respective of the 10 new countries. Although the 
coefficients of control variables are of secondary interest, the results are in conformity with our 
expectations and the results of the previous literature.  
The long-run equilibrium test for the value of H is performed; the data appear to be in 
long-run equilibrium, and the Panzar and Rosse test can be meaningfully interpreted. 
The foreseen structural changes require the need for adjustment to be taken seriously by 
all participants in the financial system. This adjustment appears to have intensified in recent 
years, as there has been an increase in merger activity, an establishment of alliances and an 
introduction of new products and services, often based on modern information technology. The 
process of structural change embodies an element of risk, but if these risks are identified early 
and analysed carefully, then they can be duly taken into account. 
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Table 5: Results (EU-15 vs. 10 new EU Countries) (Interest Income/Assets) 
 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
Dependent Variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets      
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  z  Prob>z Coefficient  Std.  Err.  z  Prob>z 
Ln wL 0.134031**  0.011471  11.68  0.000  0.153340**  0.025897  5.92  0.000 
Ln wF   0.388709**  0.018370  21.16  0.000  0.572464**  0.040310  14.20  0.000 
Ln wC 0.013843**  0.003972  3.49  0.000  0.051457**  0.017301  2.97  0.003 
Ln E/A  0.033287**  0.004279  7.78  0.000  -0.041507*  0.017107  -2.43  0.015 
Ln LLP/L  0.048170**  0.002948  16.34  0.000 0.027949**  0.008005  3.49  0.000 
Ln L/A  0.178215**  0.010810  16.49  0.000  0.150449**  0.046849  3.21  0.001 
Ln  D/CCTF  -0.023531** 0.002445  -9.62  0.000 -0.037751** 0.008983  -4.20  0.000 
Ln  OI/A  -0.022103** 0.002293  -9.64  0.000 -0.060753** 0.010931  -5.56  0.000 
year1998 0.107361**  0.006499  16.52  0.000  0.112233**  0.032393  3.46  0.001 
year1999 0.059721**  0.005826  10.25  0.000  0.030468  0.031067  0.98  0.327 
year2000 0.053001**  0.005834  9.08  0.000  0.038777  0.030040  1.29  0.197 
year2001 0.035419**  0.005540  6.39  0.000  -0.021576  0.027625  -0.78  0.435 
 + country dummies included             
_cons 0.962457**  0.067076  14.35  0.000  1.104243**  0.193614  5.70  0.000 
R-sq    0.558       0.8293      
   Wald chi2 (26) =2749.23 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(21)=2069.87 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.536582  0.028473 18.85  0.000  0.777260  0.049581 15.68  0.000 
Wald test for H=1  chi2(1) =264.89 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =20.18 (0.0000) 
Wald test for H=0  chi2(1) =355.14 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 245.76 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 6: Results (EU-15 vs. 10 new EU Countries) (Organic Income/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
Dependent Variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets      
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Err.  z  Prob>z  Coefficient  Std. Err.  z  Prob>z 
Ln wL 0.24946**  0.01114  22.40  0.000  0.18945**  0.02824  6.71  0.000 
Ln wF   0.35292**  0.01718  20.54  0.000  0.47927**  0.04085  11.73  0.000 
Ln wC 0.04486**  0.00394  11.40  0.000  0.06226**  0.01732  3.59  0.000 
Ln E/A  0.02167**  0.00426  5.09  0.000  -0.05718**  0.01892  -3.02  0.003 
Ln LLP/L  0.03838**  0.00270  14.23  0.000  0.03800**  0.00857  4.44  0.000 
Ln L/A  0.08695**  0.01105  7.87  0.000  0.08251  0.04368  1.89  0.059 
Ln D/CCTF  -0.00739**  0.00256  -2.88  0.004  -0.02724**  0.00915  -2.98  0.003 
Ln OI/A  -0.02074**  0.00246  -8.43  0.000  -0.06617**  0.01097  -6.03  0.000 
year1998 0.07953**  0.00606  13.13  0.000  0.11475**  0.03303  3.47  0.001 
year1999 0.05648**  0.00551  10.25  0.000  0.04441  0.03088  1.44  0.150 
year2000 0.05645**  0.00553  10.21  0.000  0.03476  0.03095  1.12  0.261 
year2001 0.02471**  0.00520  4.75  0.000  -0.02219  0.02840  -0.78  0.435 
 + country dummies included             
_cons 1.83983**  0.06622  27.79  0.000  1.78402**  0.20250  8.81  0.000 
R-sq   0.5808        0.7889       
   Wald chi2(26)=3216.50 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(21)=1621.50 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.64723  0.02668 24.26  0.000  0.73098  0.05292 13.81  0.000 
Wald test for H=1  chi2( 1) = 174.83 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =25.84 (0.0000) 
Wald test for H=0  chi2(1) = 588.52 (0.0000) chi2(1)  =190.79  (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 7: Results (EU-15 vs. 10 new EU Countries) (Total Revenues/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors 
Dependent Variable: Total Operating Income/ Total Assets      
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  z  Prob>z Coefficient  Std.  Err.  z Prob>z 
Ln wL 0.58238**  0.01145  50.84  0.000  0.34134**  0.05294  6.45  0.000 
Ln wF   -0.03879*  0.01615  -2.40  0.016  0.05550  0.05894  0.94  0.346 
Ln wC 0.06523**  0.00530  12.31  0.000  0.06265*  0.02541  2.47  0.014 
Ln E/A  0.01996**  0.00640  3.12  0.002  -0.02581  0.03629  -0.71  0.477 
Ln LLP/L  0.08009**  0.00367  21.82  0.000 0.04969**  0.01561  3.18  0.001 
Ln L/A  0.15186**  0.01158  13.12  0.000  0.12716*  0.05567  2.28  0.022 
Ln D/CCTF  -0.00245  0.00348  -0.71  0.481  -0.02489  0.01665  -1.50  0.135 
year1998 0.09666**  0.00755  12.80  0.000  -0.05122  0.05834  -0.88  0.380 
year1999 0.06523**  0.00714  9.14  0.000  0.09591  0.05113  1.88  0.061 
year2000 0.05390**  0.00677  7.96  0.000  0.08314  0.05047  1.65  0.100 
year2001 0.01271*  0.00641  1.98  0.048  -0.01364  0.04864  -0.28  0.779 
 + country dummies included             
_cons 2.80720  0.07677  36.57  0.000 2.46418  0.34510  7.14  0.000 
R-sq    0.7644       0.5218      
   Wald chi2(25)=17485.91 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(20)=473.07 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.60882  0.02565 23.73  0.000  0.45948  0.08657 5.31  0.000 
Wald test for H=1  chi2(1) = 232.55 (0.0000)  chi2( 1) =38.98 (0.0000) 
Wald test for H=0  chi2(1) = 563.31 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 28.17 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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Table 8: Results for the Major EU Countries (Interest Income/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors: Dependent Variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets        
   FRANCE        GERMANY        ITALY        SPAIN        UK       
Variable  Coefficient  z  Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z Coefficient  z  Prob>z Coefficient  z  Prob>z 
ln wL  0.158549  5.30  0.000  0.123663  9.34 0.000  0.184552 4.36  0.000  0.100004 2.78  0.005 0.192886  6.80  0.000 
  0.029942     0.013245     0.042377     0.035935     0.028367   
ln wF    0.476742  21.64  0.000  0.261938  10.71 0.000  0.442232 7.93  0.000  0.414836 9.88  0.000 0.457358  9.26  0.000 
  0.022031     0.024457     0.055774     0.041979     0.049407   
ln wC  0.065349  3.85  0.000  0.008133  1.77 0.077  0.038236 3.08  0.002 -0.005159  -0.29  0.770 0.020158  1.16  0.245 
  0.016975     0.004603     0.012415     0.017619     0.017327   
ln  E/A  0.055648  5.62  0.000  0.020150  3.99 0.000  0.026107 2.07  0.038 -0.015064  -1.14  0.253 0.039513  3.34  0.001 
  0.009897     0.005054     0.012613     0.013185     0.011835   
ln  LLP/L  0.020955  2.42  0.016  0.029904  10.63 0.000  0.035663 2.57  0.010  0.047752 3.38  0.001 0.048918  4.24  0.000 
  0.008667     0.002813     0.013878     0.014131     0.011545   
ln  L/A  0.163096  4.29  0.000  0.156707  8.66 0.000  0.106701 3.09  0.002  0.362821 9.28  0.000 0.282679  8.35  0.000 
  0.038025     0.018106     0.034533     0.039101     0.033839   
ln  D/CCTF  -0.021467  -2.84  0.004  -0.020410  -5.00  0.000  -0.034406 -7.65 0.000  -0.017959 -2.44 0.015 -0.001320  -0.16  0.874 
  0.007552     0.004080     0.004495     0.007375     0.008324   
ln  OI/A  -0.010546  -1.94  0.052  -0.020789  -7.75  0.000  -0.028908 -4.22 0.000  -0.027745 -2.73 0.006 -0.005919  -0.59  0.556 
  0.005437     0.002682     0.006853     0.010146     0.010048   
Year1998  0.087515  3.87  0.000  0.083420  14.69 0.000  0.156677 4.33  0.000  0.189273 6.03  0.000 0.129143  2.96  0.003 
  0.022588     0.005677     0.036183     0.031392     0.043679   
Year1999  0.044025  2.26  0.024  0.046755  8.68 0.000  0.083464 4.52  0.000  0.097879 3.36  0.001 0.084807  2.25  0.024 
  0.019495     0.005386     0.018468     0.029144     0.037622   
Year2000  0.046713  2.47  0.014  0.038931  7.25 0.000  0.087567 4.95  0.000  0.054422 1.86  0.062 0.089056  2.20  0.028 
  0.018948     0.005368     0.017693     0.029194     0.040554   
Year2001  0.029597  1.68  0.094  0.027147  5.17 0.000  0.062678 3.51  0.000  0.059669 2.11  0.035 0.052843  1.40  0.163 
  0.017661     0.005254     0.017836     0.028300     0.037870   
constant  0.734993  3.47  0.001  1.213981  12.52 0.000  1.163353 5.49  0.000  0.143777 0.54  0.592 0.719420  3.48  0.001 
  0.211693     0.096966     0.211718     0.268454     0.206764   
R-sq  0.7234     0.4078     0.6967     0.5791     0.8004    
    Wald chi2(12)=996.52 (0.0000)   Wald chi2(12) = 957.38 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=959.34 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12) =419.58 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12) =450.28 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.7006395  15.00 0.000  0.3937345  11.09 0.000  0.6650204  6.8 0.000 0.5096811  7.74 0.000  0.6704021  10.96 0.000 
  0.0467095     0.0355082     0.0978576     0.0658417     0.0611876   
Wald test 
for H=1  chi2(  1) =41.08 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =291.52 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =11.72 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) = 55.46 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =29.02 (0.0000) 
Wald test 
for H=0  chi2(  1) =225.00 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) = 122.96 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =46.18 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =59.92 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =120.04 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance.   41
Table 9: Results for the Major EU Countries (Organic Income/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors: Dependent Variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets        
   FRANCE        GERMANY        ITALY        SPAIN        UK       
Variable Coefficient  z  Prob>z  Coefficient z  Prob>z  Coefficient z Prob>z  Coefficient z  Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z 
ln wL  0.338682 10.01  0.000  0.244927 17.96  0.000  0.316375  7.82  0.000  0.223470  7.52  0.000  0.356246  9.80  0.000 
  0.033824     0.013635     0.040475     0.029725     0.036355    
ln wF    0.391516 17.77  0.000  0.310118 13.53  0.000  0.394443  7.67  0.000  0.375316  9.74  0.000  0.347368  5.06  0.000 
  0.022033     0.022922     0.051424     0.038529     0.068619    
ln wC  0.095996 5.13  0.000  0.042202 9.65  0.000  0.069777  6.72  0.000  0.020263 1.38  0.167  0.036448 1.60  0.109 
  0.018727     0.004372     0.010376     0.014661     0.022754    
ln  E/A  0.033428 4.28  0.000  0.010586 2.26  0.024  0.004491  0.36  0.718  -0.021176  -1.62  0.106  0.035460 2.18  0.030 
  0.007810     0.004689     0.012445     0.013104     0.016297    
ln  LLP/L  0.019931 2.35  0.019  0.030628  11.82  0.000 -0.009369  -0.87  0.386  0.031046 2.36  0.018  0.027352 1.51  0.131 
  0.008471     0.002591     0.010816     0.013156     0.018103    
ln  L/A  0.049394 1.24  0.217  0.051131 2.44  0.015  0.066032  2.10  0.036  0.137425 4.64  0.000  0.215162 5.06  0.000 
  0.039969     0.020919     0.031492     0.029625     0.042554    
ln  D/CCTF  -0.014678 -1.69  0.091  -0.020971 -4.14  0.000  0.002630  0.66  0.506  -0.009201 -1.63  0.103  0.021590  1.93  0.053 
  0.008682     0.005071     0.003957     0.005644     0.011166    
ln  OI/A  0.000189  0.04  0.969  -0.021375 -7.10  0.000  -0.015972  -2.63  0.009  -0.014431 -1.82  0.069  -0.024523 -1.35  0.178 
  0.004869     0.003009     0.006080     0.007933     0.018187    
year1998  0.021746 1.02  0.306  0.062305  11.91  0.000  0.107972  3.24  0.001  0.106079 3.68  0.000  0.148708 2.73  0.006 
  0.021230     0.005232     0.033344     0.028814     0.054431    
year1999  0.008149 0.44  0.661  0.049216 9.52  0.000  0.088363  5.30  0.000  0.071160 2.63  0.008  0.119183 2.42  0.016 
  0.018559     0.005172     0.016670     0.027009     0.049302    
year2000  0.031046 1.68  0.092  0.041822 8.11  0.000  0.105567  6.53  0.000  0.055769 2.19  0.029  0.113624 2.38  0.017 
  0.018449     0.005156     0.016158     0.025488     0.047795    
year2001  0.014918 0.87  0.384  0.016127 3.24  0.001  0.048828  2.94  0.003  0.031567 1.28  0.201  0.064964 1.52  0.128 
  0.017132     0.004984     0.016604     0.024677     0.042661    
constant  2.194804 10.06  0.000  2.095707 19.13  0.000  1.958820  9.63  0.000  1.737448  8.60  0.000  1.883676  6.53  0.000 
  0.218205     0.109538     0.203305     0.201939     0.288397    
R-sq  0.7070     0.4757     0.7201     0.5811     0.7759    
   Wald chi2(12)=1013.06 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=1041.06 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=758.89 (0.0000)   Wald chi2(12)=350.27 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12) = 561.74 (0.000) 
H-statistic 0.826193  17.65 0.000  0.597248  17.59 0.000  0.780595  8.54 0.000  0.619049  10.85 0.000 0.740061  10.70 0.000 
  0.046803     0.033953     0.091400     0.057031     0.069196    
Wald test 
for H=1  chi2(  1)=13.79 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =140.71 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =5.76 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =44.62 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =14.11 (0.0000) 
Wald test 
for H=0  chi2(  1) =311.61 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =309.42 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =72.94 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =117.82 (0.0000)  chi2(  1) =114.39 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance.   42
Table 10: Results for the Major EU Countries (Total Revenue /Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors: Dependent Variable: Total Operating Income/ Total Assets        
   FRANCE        GERMANY        ITALY        SPAIN        UK       
Variable  Coefficient  z Prob>z  Coefficient  z Prob>z Coefficient z Prob>z  Coefficient z Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z 
ln wL  0.676560 19.79  0.000  0.581392 41.46  0.000  0.528053 10.53  0.000  0.469977 10.26  0.000  0.747530  19.58  0.000 
  0.034194     0.014024     0.050142     0.045821     0.038170    
ln wF    -0.009335 -0.44  0.656  -0.124953 -5.25  0.000  -0.005881 -0.11  0.910  -0.023618 -0.47  0.639  -0.165155  -1.81  0.071 
  0.020988     0.023781     0.052283     0.050380     0.091445    
ln wC  0.161851 10.55  0.000  0.063164 10.29  0.000  0.038931  3.57  0.000  -0.017166  -0.71  0.476  0.021824  0.68  0.494 
  0.015335     0.006137     0.010902     0.024083     0.031879    
ln  E/A  0.011676 1.01  0.313  0.005292 0.89  0.375  0.001808 0.13  0.900  -0.039559  -2.04  0.041  0.030285  1.30  0.192 
  0.011565     0.005961     0.014316     0.019386     0.023231    
ln  LLP/L  0.070167 6.37  0.000  0.070538  20.93  0.000  0.028813 2.40  0.016  0.053651 2.47  0.014  0.121334  5.16  0.000 
  0.011010     0.003370     0.012013     0.021754     0.023492    
ln  L/A  0.193650 6.28  0.000  0.073768 4.70  0.000  0.199413 5.78  0.000  0.160003 3.76  0.000  0.462661  8.35  0.000 
  0.030841     0.015711     0.034497     0.042501     0.055428    
ln  D/CCTF  -0.011387 -1.17  0.243  -0.020306 -3.37  0.001  -0.005935 -1.41  0.159  -0.013159 -1.43  0.151  0.090793  3.16  0.002 
  0.009763     0.006027     0.004214     0.009171     0.028776    
year1998  -0.054226  -2.08  0.037  0.094298  13.40  0.000 0.193101  6.10  0.000 0.134492  3.01  0.003 0.099294 1.31 0.189 
  0.026043     0.007035     0.031646     0.044622     0.075642    
year1999  -0.019807  -0.82  0.414  0.086877  13.32  0.000 0.053419  3.51  0.000 0.094761  2.48  0.013 0.043966 0.64 0.523 
  0.024260     0.006523     0.015203     0.038181     0.068820    
year2000  -0.004135  -0.19  0.849  0.042416 6.84  0.000  0.119168 8.42  0.000  0.046707 1.29  0.197  0.110494  1.58  0.114 
  0.021729     0.006198     0.014157     0.036213     0.069983    
year2001  -0.003674  -0.17  0.865  0.003936 0.65  0.517  0.062455 4.17  0.000  0.045864 1.15  0.252  0.076797  1.22  0.223 
  0.021544     0.006081     0.014988     0.040024     0.062970    
constant  2.726000 13.49  0.000  3.315520 35.66  0.000  2.566640 10.55  0.000  2.860073  9.24  0.000  2.811100  7.71  0.000 
  0.202066     0.092971     0.243266     0.309618     0.364388    
R-sq    0.8257     0.8135     0.6298     0.6529     0.7897    
   Wald chi2(11)=3244.88 (0.0000)   Wald chi2(11)=7658.02 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(11)=862.45 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(11)=316.88 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(11) =1864.80 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.8290756  17.02 0.000  0.5196035  14.42 0.000  0.5611029  5.54 0.000  0.4291941  5.32 0.000  0.6041993  6.64 0.000 
  0.0487239     0.0360219     0.1012586     0.0806075     0.0909942    
Wald test for 
H=1  chi2(1) =12.31 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =177.85 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =18.79 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =50.14 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =18.92 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  chi2(1) =289.54 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =208.07 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 30.71 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =28.35 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =44.09 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance.   43
 
Table 11: Results (Large vs. Small Banks) (Interest Income/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors    
Dependent Variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets          
   Large         Medium-sized   Small      
Variable Coefficient  z  Prob>z  Coefficient z  Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z 
ln wL 0.131295**  6.29  0.000  0.075584**  4.86 0.000  0.112116**  7.53  0.000 
  0.020890     0.015564     0.014898    
ln wF   0.401017**  9.79  0.000  0.368121** 13.5  0.000  0.385157**  16.35 0.000 
  0.040941     0.027274     0.023561    
ln wC 0.007620  0.35  0.729  0.018337  1.67 0.096  0.021292**  5.72  0.000 
  0.022012     0.011012     0.003721    
ln E/A  -0.012728  -0.78  0.434  0.027516** 2.86  0.004  0.016822**  3.27 0.001 
  0.016262     0.009610     0.005151    
ln LLP/L  0.001047  0.09  0.931  0.056039** 6.62  0.000  0.041946**  13.55 0.000 
  0.012124     0.008461     0.003096    
ln L/A  0.137024**  3.89  0.000  0.100436** 4.75  0.000  0.170072**  13.89 0.000 
  0.035263     0.021161     0.012240    
ln D/CCTF  -0.074619**  -4.51  0.000  -0.023594**  -4.01  0.000  -0.013965**  -5.88  0.000 
  0.016530     0.005887     0.002374    
ln OI/A  0.019683  1.48  0.138  -0.008990  -1.39  0.163  -0.011956**  -4.62  0.000 
  0.013256     0.006448     0.002589    
year1998 0.139714**  4.14  0.000  0.117574** 5.32  0.000  0.089282**  11.52 0.000 
  0.033752     0.022088     0.007749    
year1999 0.077510**  2.82  0.005  0.052151* 2.43  0.015  0.049337**  7.70 0.000 
  0.027529     0.021490     0.006404    
year2000 0.079927**  2.73  0.006  0.069949** 3.42  0.001  0.045565**  6.89 0.000 
  0.029326     0.020433     0.006610    
year2001 0.044463  1.55  0.122  0.047743*  2.31 0.021  0.027414**  4.45  0.000 
  0.028751     0.020694     0.006164    
constant 1.273328**  5.06  0.000  1.045673** 8.68  0.000  0.911039**  10.72 0.000 
  0.251737     0.120489     0.084995    
R-sq    0.5725     0.467     0.5104    
   Wald chi2(12)=302.29 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=376.02 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=1461.50 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.539932  9.97 0.000  0.462041  12.05 0.000  0.518565  14.45 0.000 
  0.0541483     0.0383515     0.0358834    
Wald test for 
H=1  chi2(1) =72.19 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =196.76 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 180.01 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  chi2(1) =99.43(0.0000)  chi2(1) =145.14 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 208.84 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 12: Results (Large vs. Small Banks) (Organic Income/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors    
Dependent Variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets             
   Large        Medium-sized       Small      
Variable Coefficient  z Prob>z  Coefficient z  Prob>z  Coefficient  z  Prob>z 
ln wL  0.176657**  8.94  0.000  0.161826** 10.37  0.000  0.249273** 16.52  0.000 
  0.019759     0.015607     0.015088    
ln wF    0.354531**  9.96  0.000  0.341097** 13.65  0.000  0.338998** 15.45  0.000 
  0.035599     0.024980     0.021942    
ln wC  0.005088 0.26  0.792  0.043643** 4.16  0.000  0.061036**  16.05  0.000 
  0.019277     0.010500     0.003803    
ln  E/A  -0.008933  -0.61  0.539  0.053450** 4.68  0.000  0.013738** 2.75  0.006 
  0.014549     0.011427     0.004991    
ln  LLP/L  0.010376 0.86  0.388  0.038597** 4.80  0.000  0.025362** 9.14  0.000 
  0.012016     0.008045     0.002775    
ln  L/A  0.169032** 5.63  0.000  0.038188 1.94  0.052  0.060970** 4.74  0.000 
  0.030034     0.019635     0.012858    
ln  D/CCTF  -0.070554** -5.41  0.000  0.000020  0.00  0.997  -0.003524 -1.40  0.162 
  0.013031     0.006346     0.002518    
ln OI/A  0.020624  1.66  0.096  -0.006064  -0.91 0.364  -0.008951**  -3.25  0.001 
  0.012399     0.006686     0.002756    
year1998  0.115045** 3.75  0.000  0.094477** 4.37  0.000  0.057079** 8.02  0.000 
  0.030675     0.021614     0.007120    
year1999  0.071080** 2.82  0.005  0.046074* 2.14  0.033  0.043656** 7.21  0.000 
  0.025211     0.021555     0.006055    
year2000  0.087861** 3.25  0.001  0.066311** 3.19  0.001  0.047565** 7.68  0.000 
  0.027063     0.020781     0.006193    
year2001 0.043377  1.63  0.103  0.039714 1.89  0.059  0.015791** 2.72  0.006 
  0.026610     0.021014     0.005796    
constant  1.588365**  7.02  0.000  1.649929** 15.14  0.000  1.944919** 21.49  0.000 
  0.226155     0.108974     0.090516    
R-sq    0.5993     0.4655     0.5302    
   Wald chi2(12)=428.83 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=428.45 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(12)=1370.76 (0.0000) 
H-
statistic 0.536276  11.37 0.000 0.546566  15.01 0.000  0.649307  19.35 0.000 
  0.047176     0.036402     0.033551    
Wald test 
for H=1  chi2( 1) =96.62 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =155.16 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =109.26 (0.0000) 
Wald test 
for H=0  chi2( 1) =129.22 (0.0000)  chi2(1) = 225.44 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =374.54 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
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Table 13: Results (Large vs. Small Banks) (Total Revenues/Assets) 
 
Linear regression Model, with heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors    
Dependent Variable: Total Operating Income/ Total Assets             
   Large        Medium-sized     Small      
Variable Coefficient  z  Prob>z  Coefficient z Prob>z  Coefficient  z Prob>z 
ln wL 0.540869**  16.63  0.000  0.566986**  30.31 0.000  0.549582**  33.58 0.000 
  0.032525     0.018709     0.016365    
ln wF    -0.131784**  -3.93  0.000  -0.042349 -1.59  0.113  -0.025727 -1.24  0.214 
  0.033497     0.026708     0.020705    
ln wC 0.011592  0.49  0.626  0.085926**  5.13 0.000  0.087757**  16.97 0.000 
  0.023806     0.016764     0.005171    
ln E/A  -0.002912  -0.12  0.905  0.056308** 3.18  0.001  0.080788**  12.66  0.000 
  0.024446     0.017717     0.006381    
ln LLP/L  0.064615**  3.29  0.001  0.073651** 6.62  0.000  0.060523**  15.48  0.000 
  0.019614     0.011119     0.003909    
ln L/A  0.366136**  9.49  0.000  0.212420** 7.92  0.000  0.107788** 8.00  0.000 
  0.038575     0.026812     0.013471    
ln  D/CCTF -0.133204** -5.19  0.000  0.016121  0.95  0.340  -0.019196**  -6.82  0.000 
  0.025657     0.016888     0.002816    
year1998 0.087788*  2.45  0.014  0.084205** 2.73  0.006  0.086436**  10.08  0.000 
  0.035871     0.030897     0.008577    
year1999 0.071084*  2.06  0.039  0.062133* 2.04  0.042  0.056669** 7.44  0.000 
  0.034516     0.030524     0.007614    
year2000 0.105257**  2.83  0.005  0.059562* 2.12  0.034  0.040989** 5.51  0.000 
  0.037251     0.028046     0.007433    
year2001 0.061326  1.74  0.082  0.009742  0.38 0.707  0.007264  1.01 0.314 
  0.035280     0.025919     0.007221    
constant 2.668306**  10.73  0.000  2.414342** 13.04  0.000  2.719929** 26.87  0.000 
  0.248785     0.185176     0.101242    
R-sq    0.9091     0.771     0.6689    
   Wald chi2(11)=1432.59 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(11)=2623.20 (0.0000)  Wald chi2(11)=5367.88 (0.000) 
H-statistic 0.420677  6.79 0.000  0.610563  15.26 0.000  0.611611  18.43 0.000 
  0.061937     0.040015     0.033181    
Wald test for 
H=1  chi2(1) = 87.49 (0.0000)    chi2(1)=94.72 (0.0000)  chi2(1) =137.01 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  chi2(1) =46.13 (0.0000)    chi2(1) =232.82 (0.0000)   chi2(1) =339.77 (0.0000)  
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics.Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. p-values in 
parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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Annex 2: Summary of Literature on Measuring Bank Competition Using Panzar-Rosse Methodology  
 
Authors Countries  considered  Period  Results 
Shaffer (1982)  New York  1979  monopolistic competition 
Gelfand & Spiller (1987)  Uruguay  1977-1980  monopolistic competition 
Nathan & Neave (1989)  Canada  1982-1984  monopolistic competition (1983-84) 
        perfect competition (1982) 
Lloyd-Williams et.al. (1991) Japan  1986-1988  Monopoly 
Molyneux et. al. (1994)  France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK  1986-1989  monopolistic competition 
        monopoly for Italy (1987-89) 
Vesala (1995)  Finland  1985-1992  monopolistic competition (1985-88 / 1991-92) 
        perfect competition (1989-90) 
Molyneux et.al. (1996)  Japan  1986-1988  monopoly (1986), monopolistic competition (1988) 
Coccorese (1998)   Italy  1988-1996 
monopolistic competition (perfect competition in 1992 / 
1994) 
Hondroyiannis et.al. (1999)  Greece  1993-1995 monopolistic  competition 
Barajas et.al. (2000)  Colombia  1985-1998  monopolistic competition 
Bikker & Haaf (2000b)  23 Industrialised Countries   1988-1998  monopolistic competition 
Bikker & Groeneveld (2000)  15 EU Countries  1989-1996  monopolistic competition 
De Bandt & Davis (2000)  France, Germany, Italy, US  1992-1996  monopolistic competition 
Smith & Tripe (2001)  New Zealand  1996-1999  monopolistic competition (but monopoly for 1997) 
Yildirim & Philippatos (2002)  14 Central and Eastern European Countries  1993-2000  monopolistic competition  
      (except for FYR of Macedonia and Slovakia) 
Hempell (2002)  Germany  1993-1998 monopolistic  competition 
Belaisch (2003)  Brazil  1997-2000  oligopoly 
Yeyati & Micco (2003)  8 Latin American Countries  1993-2002  monopolistic competition 
Claessens & Laeven (2003)  50 countries  1994-2001  monopolistic competition 
Drakos & Konstantinou (2003)  10 Central and Eastern European Countries 1992-2000  monopolistic  competition (monopoly for Latvia) 
Coccorese (2004)  Italy  1997-1999  monopolistic competition 
Gelos & Roldos (2004)  8 Latin American and Eastern European Countries 1994-1999  monopolistic  competition (exc. Argentina and Hungary) 
Boutillier et.al. (2004)  Germany, France, Italy, Spain  1993-2000  monopolistic competition 
Jiang et.al. (2004)  Hong Kong  1992-2002  perfect competition   53
Annex 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Country TA  IR/A  TR/A  L/A  E/A  PE/A  IE/F  OE/FA  LLP/L 
Austria 4,510  5.293  3.673  58.628  6.708 1.339 4.002  94.852 0.638 
  (17,700) (1.396) (1.977) (17.729) (4.082) (0.606) (3.258) (125.687) (0.409) 
Belgium 21,200  5.742  2.793  43.034  7.070 0.949 4.415 194.799 0.820 
  (64,700) (1.541) (2.211) (20.498) (5.008) (0.740) (1.736) (213.227) (0.949) 
Denmark 3,734  6.837  5.657  57.592  13.594 2.090 3.040 146.113 1.123 
  (21,000) (1.339) (1.816) (13.017) (5.544) (0.847) (0.923) (189.068) (0.758) 
Finland 39,200  3.688  4.796  66.599  6.769 0.836 3.596 253.402 0.119 
  (64,000) (1.784) (4.909)  (8.785) (3.649) (0.342) (2.884) (460.090) (0.167) 
France 21,400  6.264  3.977  58.623  7.776 1.544 5.238 180.300 0.772 
  (78,400) (3.253) (2.566) (22.144) (5.771) (0.931) (4.881) (190.781) (1.219) 
Germany 3,545  5.766  3.393  61.696  5.336 1.418 3.850  84.470 0.954 
  (31,500) (0.922) (1.408) (13.354) (2.841) (0.567) (2.460) (113.189) (0.859) 
Greece 12,400  6.706  4.762  46.595  11.392 1.781 5.248  80.744 1.029 
  (15,500) (2.700) (2.027) (15.237) (6.709) (0.854) (2.982) (128.590) (1.184) 
Ireland 11,700  5.052  2.542  51.833  9.478 0.504 5.624 282.591 0.464 
  (36,000) (1.930) (2.740) (22.139) (7.854) (0.716) (4.246) (304.291) (0.893) 
Italy 3,273  5.615  4.248  54.890  12.343 1.662 3.842 133.567 0.731 
  (18,200) (1.601) (1.641) (14.540) (4.868) (0.721) (2.796) (159.991) (0.701) 
Luxembourg 11,600 5.796 2.283 28.481 6.256 0.660 6.344 306.803 0.647 
  (52,100) (2.899) (2.050) (14.975) (6.306) (0.754) (4.918) (349.148) (0.953) 
Netherlands 31,800 5.973 3.048 61.790 6.490 0.985 7.527 163.938 0.570 
  (9,560) (2.892) (3.369) (23.062) (4.127) (1.095) (5.919) (174.365) (0.931) 
Portugal 16,800  5.959  3.763  54.973  8.824 1.092 6.118 128.956 0.872 
  (4,690) (4.170) (2.872) (21.907) (7.606) (0.560) (6.307) (176.874) (1.275) 
Spain 11,600  5.122  3.774  63.524  9.017 1.394 3.061  91.682 0.556 
  (3,720) (1.390) (1.461) (18.869) (6.294) (0.832) (2.183) (132.300) (0.529) 
Sweden 30,000  5.652  4.617  73.387  11.665 1.531 4.010 296.542 0.432 
  (7,930) (0.798) (2.307) (17.805) (5.201) (1.139) (5.900) (307.069) (0.703) 
UK 21,200  6.078  3.770  57.033  9.075 1.206 5.150 243.164 0.679 
  (62,200) (3.006) (4.421) (27.616) (7.749) (1.635) (3.012) (317.146) (1.016) 
EU-15  7,574  5.779  3.697  58.891  7.719  1.445  4.123  123.227  0.852 
  (41,500)  (1.734)  (2.057)  (17.295)  (5.365)  (0.785)  (3.165)  (174.297)  (0.878) 
 
Note: TA: Total Assets; IR/A: Interest Revenue/Total Assets; TR/A: Total Revenue/Total Assets; L/A: Net 
Loans/Total Assets; E/A: Equity/Total Assets; PE/A: Personnel Expenses/Assets; IE/F: Interest 
Expenses/Funds; OE/FA: Other Operating Costs/Fixed Assets; LLP/L: Loan Loss Provisions/Loans. 
Figures are means (in million of € for TA and percentage for all other variables) for the period 1998-2002. 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses. Further descriptive statistics can be provided upon requested.    54
 
Country TA  IR/A  TR/A  L/A  E/A  PE/A  IE/F  OE/FA  LLP/L 
Cyprus 2,055  9.778  4.268  51.810  9.752 1.390 8.806 123.266 1.184 
  (3,538) (7.872) (2.994) (19.464) (6.420) (0.678) (7.627) (180.531) (1.384) 
Czech 3,058  7.071  4.167  37.290  7.782 1.125 5.831 159.204 2.446 
  (5,065) (3.958) (2.422) (18.036) (4.240) (0.990) (4.902) (152.423) (2.990) 
Estonia 1,850  7.131  6.261  51.998  10.138 2.004 4.527  55.337 3.031 
  (2,662) (1.818) (2.041) (14.318) (3.252) (1.082) (1.486)  (26.872) (2.391) 
Hungary 1,110  10.683  6.799  50.670  9.986 1.790 8.875 268.579 0.972 
  (1,527) (4.399) (3.341) (17.033) (4.473) (1.860) (5.526) (336.772) (0.910) 
Latvia 0,237  6.501  6.378  41.342  12.014 1.990 3.395 124.921 2.684 
  (0,350) (2.466) (2.096) (21.554) (6.646) (1.375) (2.110)  (99.213) (2.539) 
Lithuania 0,645  6.272  7.113  45.775  13.320 3.087 3.647  41.078 2.498 
  (0,991) (1.567) (1.838) (12.964) (7.194) (1.440) (1.275)  (20.085) (2.755) 
Malta 2,210  5.461  3.291  40.707  11.534 0.952 4.432 156.278 0.679 
  (3,766) (1.660) (1.470) (13.767) (9.771) (0.728) (2.139) (224.295) (0.475) 
Poland 2,805  10.847  7.152  51.936  11.796 2.018 8.806 178.688 2.129 
  (4,409) (3.271) (2.443) (15.915) (6.163) (1.232) (3.500) (248.596) (1.622) 
Slovakia 0,817  9.093  5.343  44.354  10.256 0.933 7.721 109.311 3.010 
 (1,174)  (4.527)  (2.718)  (14.344) (5.715) (0.342) (4.730) (159.574)  2.753 
Slovenia 0,809  7.402  5.385  52.598  10.206 1.323 5.101  90.531 2.007 
  (1,096) (1.959) (1.463)  (8.228) (3.471) (0.230) (1.405) (104.351) (1.717) 
10 new EU  1,664  8.716  5.876  47.805  10.579  1.660  6.802  152.561  2.058 
  (3,220)  (4.386)  (2.768)  (17.086)  (5.849)  (0.966)  (4.753)  (217.510)  (2.133) 
 
Note: TA: Total Assets; IR/A: Interest Revenue/Total Assets; TR/A: Total Revenue/Total Assets; L/A: Net 
Loans/Total Assets; E/A: Equity/Total Assets; PE/A: Personnel Expenses/Assets; IE/F: Interest 
Expenses/Funds; OE/FA: Other Operating Costs/Fixed Assets; LLP/L: Loan Loss Provisions/Loans. 
Figures are means (in million of € for TA and percentage for all other variables) for the period 1998-2002. 
Standard errors are given in the parentheses. Further descriptive statistics can be provided upon requested. 
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Annex 3: Fixed Effects Estimators 
 
 
Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets 
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable Coefficient  Std. Err.  t-statistic  Prob>t  Coefficient Std.  Err.  t-statistic  Prob>t 
ln wL  0.151943**  0.006120 24.83  0.000  -0.014980  0.035849  -0.42 0.676 
ln wF    0.523061**  0.005163  101.31  0.000  0.590405**  0.024780 23.83 0.000 
ln wC  0.013462**  0.002687  5.01  0.000 0.022400 0.022325  1.00  0.317 
ln  E/A  0.008911*  0.004200  2.12  0.034 0.019766 0.015620  1.27  0.207 
ln  LLP/L  0.014267**  0.001164  12.26  0.000 0.005131 0.006665  0.77  0.442 
ln  L/A  0.129582**  0.007777 16.66  0.000  0.167258**  0.041234  4.06 0.000 
ln D/CCTF  0.000037  0.001983  0.02  0.985  -0.014709  0.009171  -1.60  0.110 
ln  OI/A  -0.006033**  0.001032 -5.85  0.000  -0.017048*  0.007877 -2.16  0.032 
year1998  0.046884**  0.002522 18.59  0.000  0.111227**  0.022231  5.00 0.000 
year1999  0.029629**  0.002308 12.84  0.000  0.068353**  0.018201  3.76 0.000 
year2000  0.017896**  0.002283 7.84  0.000  0.060823**  0.017712 3.43  0.001 
year2001  0.005750**  0.002133  2.70  0.007 0.010295 0.016928  0.61  0.544 
constant  1.088320**  0.046732  23.29  0.000 0.177641 0.270758  0.66  0.512 
R-sq  (overall)  0.4404       0.7138      
   F(12,5123) =1481.61  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(12,214) =92.35  Prob > F = 0.0000 
H-statistic 0.688465  0.007873 87.45  0.000  0.597825  0.048828 12.24 0.000 
Wald test for H=1  F(1, 5123) = 1565.86  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(1, 214) = 67.84  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Wald test for H=0  F(1, 5123) = 7647.21  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(1, 214) = 149.91  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :                        chi2(12)=520.72 (0.000)  chi2(12)=28.91 (0.0041) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test rejects the random effects 
(RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 

























Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets 
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-statistic Prob>t  Coefficient Std. Err.  t-statistic  Prob>t 
ln wL 0.237997**  0.006423  37.06  0.000  0.032154  0.036514  0.88  0.380 
ln wF   0.443235**  0.005418  81.81  0.000  0.521364**  0.025240  20.66  0.000 
ln wC 0.021971**  0.002820  7.79  0.000 0.018751  0.022740  0.82  0.411 
ln E/A  0.009548*  0.004407  2.17  0.030 0.021771  0.015910  1.37  0.173 
ln LLP/L  0.014947**  0.001222  12.24  0.000 0.003822  0.006789  0.56  0.574 
ln L/A  0.134272**  0.008161  16.45  0.000 0.155886** 0.042000  3.71  0.000 
ln D/CCTF  -0.001992  0.002081  -0.96  0.339  -0.010750  0.009342  -1.15  0.251 
ln OI/A  -0.007692**  0.001083  -7.10  0.000  -0.012952  0.008023  -1.61  0.108 
year1998 0.042095**  0.002646  15.91  0.000 0.099691** 0.022644  4.40  0.000 
year1999 0.037240**  0.002422  15.38  0.000 0.068369** 0.018539  3.69  0.000 
year2000 0.034094**  0.002396  14.23  0.000 0.058513** 0.018041  3.24  0.001 
year2001 0.008974**  0.002238  4.01  0.000 0.010506  0.017243  0.61  0.543 
constant 1.640262**  0.049040  33.45  0.000  0.690745  0.275786  2.50  0.013 
R-sq (overall)  0.4592        0.5914       
   F(12,5123)=1137.22  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(12,214)= 70.78  Prob > F = 0.0000 
H-statistic 0.703203  0.008262 85.12  0.000  0.572269  0.049734 11.51  0.000 
Wald test for H=1  F(1, 5123) = 1836.88  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(1, 214) = 73.97  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Wald test for H=0  F(1, 5123) = 6743.99  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(1, 214) = 132.40  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :                            chi2(12)=232.18 (0.000)  chi2(12)=80.88 (0.000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test rejects the random effects 
(RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 

























Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Total operating Income/ Total Assets 
   EU-15           New EU Countries       
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Err.  t-statistic Prob>t  Coefficient Std.  Err.  t-statistic Prob>t 
ln wL 0.4625704**  0.0105191  43.97  0.000  0.2613827** 0.0875258  2.99 0.003 
ln wF   0.0766146**  0.0089665  8.54  0.000  0.0428729  0.0610192  0.70  0.483 
ln wC 0.0508723**  0.0045849  11.10  0.000  -0.0622210  0.0539259  -1.15  0.250 
ln  E/A  0.0172980*  0.0075340 2.30  0.022  -0.0326115  0.0390034 -0.84  0.404 
ln LLP/L  0.0398258**  0.0019624  20.29 0.000  0.0127674 0.0163333  0.78  0.435 
ln L/A  0.1640840**  0.0134198  12.23  0.000 0.2073244* 0.0990329  2.09 0.037 
ln D/CCTF  -0.0104939**  0.0032516  -3.23  0.001  0.0219732  0.0214616  1.02  0.307 
year1998 0.0653931**  0.0042163  15.51  0.000  -0.0217956  0.0523361  -0.42  0.677 
year1999 0.0522063**  0.0038269  13.64  0.000 0.0778583  0.0449172  1.73  0.084 
year2000 0.0299830**  0.0037109  8.08  0.000 0.0913414  0.0437990  2.09  0.038 
year2001 -0.0074380*  0.0035684  -2.08  0.037  -0.0287547  0.0422108  -0.68  0.496 
constant 2.2351180**  0.0797665  28.02  0.000 2.1714620**  0.6636512  3.27  0.001 
R-sq (overall)  0.3299        0.2743       
   F(11,7667) = 343.16  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(11,225) = 4.30  Prob > F = 0.0000 
H-statistic 0.5900573  0.0134526 43.86  0.000  0.2420346  0.1188146 2.04  0.043 
Wald test for H=1  F(1, 7667) = 928.60  Prob > F = 0.0000  F( 1, 225) = 40.70  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Wald test for H=0  F(1, 7667) = 1923.86  Prob > F = 0.0000  F(1, 225) = 4.15  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :                        chi2(11)=301.20 (0.000)  chi2(11)== -25.40^^ 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Both the hypothesis 
for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance.  Hausman test rejects the random effects 
(RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 

























Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets    
   Large        Medium-sized     Small       
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Prob>t  Coefficient t-statistic  Prob>t  Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob>t 
ln wL  0.181963 5.61  0.000  0.0694989 4.27  0.000  0.1790510 26.35  0.000 
  0.032425     0.0162922     0.0067941    
ln wF    0.568430 20.10  0.000 0.5106057 33.30  0.000  0.5216705  95.00  0.000 
  0.028279     0.0153330     0.0054914    
ln wC  0.002382 0.12  0.906  0.0228590 3.00  0.003  0.0130037  4.58  0.000 
  0.020127     0.0076284     0.0028373    
ln  E/A  0.041345 1.61  0.109  0.0137859 1.49  0.136  0.0042137  0.84  0.399 
  0.025686     0.0092436     0.0049941    
ln  LLP/L  0.005825 0.59  0.555  0.0085571 2.19  0.029  0.0148093 12.54  0.000 
  0.009845     0.0039147     0.0011806    
ln  L/A  0.127259 3.11  0.002  0.2074008 7.96  0.000  0.1134599 14.03  0.000 
  0.040971     0.0260465     0.0080873    
ln D/CCTF  -0.014920  -1.06  0.289  0.0040997  0.59  0.554  0.0008944  0.45  0.656 
  0.014030     0.0069204     0.0020080    
ln OI/A  -0.027587  -3.20  0.002  -0.0022549  -0.66  0.510  -0.0064897  -6.18  0.000 
  0.008619     0.0034175     0.0010510    
year1998  0.074190 4.86  0.000  0.0771349 8.36  0.000  0.0421749 16.43  0.000 
  0.015265     0.0092270     0.0025668    
year1999  0.037831 2.94  0.004  0.0385035 4.74  0.000  0.0283380 11.96  0.000 
  0.012856     0.0081228     0.0023688    
year2000  0.032195 2.28  0.024  0.0346500 4.38  0.000  0.0142344  6.14  0.000 
  0.014139     0.0079155     0.0023199    
year2001  0.024004 1.97  0.051  0.0257706 3.44  0.001  0.0016629  0.77  0.442 
  0.012213     0.0074890     0.0021612    
Constant  1.005803 4.11  0.000  0.2732176 1.77  0.077  1.2969920 26.09  0.000 
  0.244933     0.1540730     0.0497177    
R-sq 
(overall)  0.4381     0.3985     0.4736    
   F(12,179) = 103.45 (0.0000)  F(12,722) = 174.30 (0.0000)  F(12,4198) = 1282.64 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.7527744  17.52 0.000  0.6029635  28.29 0.000  0.7137252  82.85 0.000 
  0.0429721     0.0213100     0.0086142   
Wald test 
for H=1  F(1,179) =33.10 (0.0000)  F(1,722) =347.13 (0.0000)  F(1,4198) =1104.41 (0.0000) 
Wald test 
for H=0  F(1,179) =306.87 (0.0000)  F(1, 722) =800.60 (0.0000)  F(1,4198) = 6864.79 (0.0000) 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :        chi2(12)=27.45 (0.0066)  chi2(12)=78.95 (0.000)  chi2(12)=420.29 (0.000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test 
rejects the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 







Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets    
   Large        Medium-sized     Small       
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob>t Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob>t Coefficient  t-statistic  Prob>t 
ln wL  0.2356853**  7.26 0.000  0.1490530**  8.40 0.000  0.2697025**  38.24  0.000 
  0.0324663     0.0177383     0.0070528    
ln wF    0.4912553**  17.35 0.000  0.4505463**  26.99 0.000  0.4369523**  76.65  0.000 
  0.0283151     0.0166939     0.0057005    
ln wC  0.0033236  0.16 0.869  0.0325857**  3.92 0.000  0.0214066**  7.27  0.000 
  0.0201521     0.0083055     0.0029454    
ln  E/A  0.0484530  1.88 0.061  0.0187691  1.86 0.063  0.0027907  0.54  0.590 
  0.0257191     0.0100640     0.0051843    
ln  LLP/L  0.0053399  0.54 0.589  0.0100441*  2.36 0.019  0.0153129**  12.49  0.000 
  0.0098572     0.0042622     0.0012255    
ln  L/A  0.1235203**  3.01 0.003  0.1909227**  6.73 0.000  0.1219502**  14.53  0.000 
  0.0410234     0.0283582     0.0083952    
ln  D/CCTF  -0.0261394  -1.86 0.064  0.0048760  0.65 0.518  -0.0014686  -0.70  0.481 
  0.0140482     0.0075347     0.0020844    
ln  OI/A  -0.0222833*  -2.58 0.011  -0.0028923  -0.78 0.437 -0.0084896**  -7.78  0.000 
  0.0086303     0.0037208     0.0010910    
year1998  0.0627281**  4.10 0.000  0.0682158**  6.79 0.000  0.0383347**  14.39  0.000 
  0.0152844     0.0100459     0.0026646    
year1999  0.0391376**  3.04 0.003  0.0433961**  4.91 0.000  0.0364682**  14.83  0.000 
  0.0128721     0.0088438     0.0024590    
year2000  0.0416677**  2.94 0.004  0.0431250**  5.00 0.000  0.0316929**  13.16  0.000 
  0.0141571     0.0086180     0.0024082    
year2001  0.0227479  1.86 0.064  0.0289126**  3.55 0.000  0.0049882*  2.22  0.026 
  0.0122281     0.0081537     0.0022435    
Constant  1.5771760**  6.43 0.000  0.8896286**  5.30 0.000  1.8505550**  35.86  0.000 
  0.2452457     0.1677480     0.0516110    
R-sq  (overall)  0.4678     0.3843     0.4863    
   F(12,179) = 87.00 (0.0000)  F(12,722) = 130.88 (0.0000)  F(12,4198) = 993.96 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.7302643  16.97 0.000  0.6321851  27.25 0.000  0.7280614  81.42 0.000 
  0.0430269     0.0232014     0.0089423    
Wald test for 
H=1  F(  1,   179) =   39.30 (0.0000)  F(  1,   722) =  251.32 (0.0000)  F(  1,  4198) =  924.79 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  F(  1,   179) =  288.06 (0.0000)  F(  1,   722) =  742.44 (0.0000)  F(  1,  4198) = 6628.85 (0.0000) 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :    chi2(12)=49.45 (0.0000)  chi2(12)=30.66 (0.0022)  chi2(12)=217.71 (0.0000)  
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test 
rejects the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
 
 







Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Total operating Income/ Total Assets       
   Large        Medium-sized      Small       
Variable  Coefficient  t-statistic Prob>t  Coefficient  t-statistic Prob>t  Coefficient  t-statistic Prob>t 
ln wL  0.6189125** 11.88  0.000  0.3951610** 11.10  0.000  0.4702832** 42.68  0.000 
  0.0520895     0.0356136     0.0110197    
ln wF    0.0267445 0.61  0.542  0.0909082** 2.81  0.005  0.0735346** 7.98  0.000 
  0.0438215     0.0323921     0.0092206    
ln wC  0.0061189 0.19  0.851  0.0599868** 3.74  0.000  0.0498122**  10.66  0.000 
  0.0325903     0.0160541     0.0046743    
ln  E/A  0.0093979 0.24  0.814  0.0208508 1.00  0.316  0.0158799 1.90  0.057 
  0.0398491     0.0207831     0.0083447    
ln  LLP/L  0.0250367 1.62  0.108  0.0449034** 5.62  0.000  0.0392857**  20.23  0.000 
  0.0154971     0.0079921     0.0019416    
ln  L/A  0.0404026 0.61  0.545  0.3835344** 7.36  0.000  0.1300867** 9.56  0.000 
  0.0666272     0.0520931     0.0136032    
ln  D/CCTF  -0.0924641**  -4.01 0.000  0.0112309  0.80 0.425 -0.0114457**  -3.58 0.000 
  0.0230509     0.0140791     0.0031930    
year1998  0.0116209 0.49  0.627  0.0810954** 4.34  0.000  0.0667167**  16.02  0.000 
  0.0238723     0.0186670     0.0041653    
year1999  0.0276540 1.36  0.177  0.0673235** 4.11  0.000  0.0523541**  13.77  0.000 
  0.0203886     0.0163920     0.0038032    
year2000  0.0457168* 2.09  0.038  0.0382041* 2.37  0.018  0.0298296** 8.15  0.000 
  0.0218574     0.0160933     0.0036583    
year2001  0.0277185  1.46 0.146  -0.0098601  -0.64 0.520  -0.0078136*  -2.22 0.027 
  0.0189908     0.0153216     0.0035218    
Constant  3.9205720** 9.86  0.000  0.8655071** 2.72  0.007  2.4277210**  29.89  0.000 
  0.3974459     0.3177389     0.0812097    
R-sq  (overall)  0.8615     0.7056     0.6372    
   F(11,193)=24.75 (0.0000)  F(11,909)=32.34 (0.0000)  F(11,6543)=317.41 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.6517758  9.76 0.000  0.5460559  11.64 0.000  0.593630  42.64 0.000 
  0.0667678     0.0469056     0.013923    
Wald test for 
H=1  F(1,193) =27.20 (0.0000)  F(1,909) =93.66 (0.0000)  F(1,6543) = 851.88 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  F(1,193) = 95.29 (0.0000)  F(1,909) = 135.53 (0.0000)  F(1,6543) = 1817.89 (0.0000) 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE :     chi2(11)=26.59 (0.0053)  chi2(11)=43.11 (0.0000)  chi2(11)=197.59 (0.0000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, 
L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in 
italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test 
rejects the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Interest Income/ Total Assets            
   FRANCE        GERMANY      ITALY      SPAIN        UK       
Variable  Coefficient t-stat  Prob>t  Coefficient t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient t-stat Prob>t Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient  t-stat Prob>
ln wL 0.12834**  5.68  0.000  0.12917**  15.71  0.000  0.26445**  13.27  0.000  0.27604**  8.04  0.000  0.01208  0.47  0.6
  0.02260     0.00822     0.01992     0.03433     0.02583    
ln wF    0.47099**  35.58  0.000 0.55156**  62.21 0.000  0.39564**  24.68 0.000  0.57294** 17.97 0.000  0.64537**  23.31  0.0
  0.01324     0.00887     0.01603     0.03189     0.02768    
ln wC 0.04949**  5.45  0.000  0.02102**  6.25  0.000  0.00602  0.86  0.388  0.01597  1.2  0.232  0.01075  0.88  0.3
  0.00908     0.00336     0.00698     0.01333     0.01223    
ln E/A  -0.00441  -0.33  0.739  -0.01230  -1.72  0.086  0.00571  0.49  0.622  -0.01425  -0.93  0.355  -0.00403  -0.22  0.8
  0.01320     0.00717     0.01157     0.01537     0.01852    
ln LLP/L  0.00699  1.64  0.102  0.01363**  12.22  0.000  0.01624**  3.69  0.000  0.01972**  3.16  0.002  -0.00097  -0.13  0.8
  0.00427     0.00112     0.00440     0.00623     0.00749   
ln L/A  0.37233**  11.55  0.000  0.09791**  9.93  0.000  0.10716**  5.44  0.000  0.14419**  3.34  0.001  0.25396**  5.51  0.0
  0.03222     0.00986     0.01969     0.04319     0.04609   
ln D/CCTF  -0.01437  -1.59  0.113  -0.00854**  -2.96  0.003  0.00113  0.29  0.772  0.00976  1.31  0.190  0.00497  0.67  0.5
  0.00905     0.00289     0.00392     0.00743     0.00739   
ln OI/A  -0.02277**  -5.76  0.000  -0.00534**  -5.48  0.000  -0.00785**  -2.63  0.009  0.00388  0.7  0.484  -0.01959*  -2.19  0.0
  0.00396     0.00098     0.00298     0.00554     0.00896   
year1998 0.08130**  7.61  0.000  0.02374**  9.58  0.000  0.11988**  10.94  0.000  0.03204  1.86  0.065  0.01826  0.85  0.3
  0.01068     0.00248     0.01096     0.01726     0.02138   
year1999 0.03410**  3.71  0.000  0.01573**  6.94  0.000  0.03797**  4.66  0.000  0.04615**  3.03  0.003  0.02438  1.45  0.
  0.00919     0.00227     0.00815     0.01522     0.01681   
year2000 0.03029**  3.34  0.001  -0.00086  -0.38  0.702  0.05858**  8.54  0.000  -0.00463  -0.41  0.683  0.01371  0.76  0.4
  0.00906     0.00225     0.00686     0.01132     0.01806   
year2001 0.01448  1.74  0.083  -0.01182**  -5.55  0.000  0.04490**  6.87  0.000  -0.00477  -0.4  0.687  -0.00671  -0.43  0.6
  0.00835     0.00213     0.00654     0.01183     0.01548   
constant -0.08623  -0.49  0.624  1.12997**  19.31  0.000  1.74242**  12.01  0.000  1.59129**  5.65  0.000  -0.23814  -0.89  0.3
  0.17592     0.05853     0.14509     0.28169     0.26660   
R-sq  (overall)  0.6412     0.2414     0.6306     0.3211     0.5384    
   F(12,473) =162.37 (0.0000)   F(12,2994) = 589.44 (0.0000)   F(12,640) = 375.19 (0.0000)   F(12,216) = 101.65 (0.0000)  F(12,176) = 140.85 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.648823 21.84 0.000  0.7017488  59.33 0.000 0.6661192  29.15 0.000  0.8649499  19.92 0.000  0.6682  20.5 0.0  62
  0.0297138      0.0118269      0.0228534      0.043427            0.032603 
Wald test for H=1  F(1, 473) =139.68 (0.0000)   F(1,2994) =635.94 (0.0000)   F(1,640) =213.44 (0.0000) 
F(1,216)=9.67 
(0.0000)   F(1,176) =103.57 (0.0000)  
Wald test for H=0  F(1, 473) =476.80 (0.0000)  F(1,2994) =3520.61(0.0000)    F(1,640) = 849.58 (0.0000)  
F(1,216) =396.70 
(0.0000)   F(1,176) =420.05 (0.0000) 
Hausman test: Ho= RE vs FE   chi2(12)=58.16 (0.000)  chi2(12)=1530.99 (0.000)  chi2(12)=44.07 (0.000)  chi2(12)== -23.16 ^^  chi2(12)=55.54 (0.000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test rejects 
the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 




























Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Organic Income/ Total Assets           
   FRANCE        GERMANY        ITALY        SPAIN        UK       
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t  Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t  Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient t-stat Prob>t 
ln wL  0.187808**  8.28  0.000 0.167169**  20.04  0.000  0.419522** 20.66 0.000  0.340701**  9.23 0.000  0.075184**  2.60 0.010 
  0.022689     0.008342     0.020304     0.036909     0.028939    
ln wF    0.416273**  31.33  0.000 0.476644**  52.99  0.000  0.305720** 18.71 0.000  0.486091** 14.18 0.000  0.566209** 18.25 0.000 
  0.013288     0.008996     0.016338     0.034284     0.031022   
ln wC  0.060730**  6.66  0.000 0.020381**  5.98  0.000  0.019457**  2.74 0.006  0.009057  0.63 0.528  0.009332  0.68 0.497 
  0.009118     0.003411     0.007112     0.014337     0.013703   
ln  E/A  -0.006494  -0.49  0.624  -0.011984  -1.65  0.099  0.004460  0.38 0.705 -0.021646  -1.31 0.192 -0.008544 -0.41 0.681 
  0.013247     0.007272     0.011787     0.016526     0.020754   
ln  LLP/L  0.004582  1.07  0.286 0.013852**  12.24  0.000  0.020359**  4.54 0.000  0.029075**  4.34 0.000 -0.001937 -0.23 0.818 
  0.004285     0.001132     0.004486     0.006699     0.008395   
ln  L/A  0.365680**  11.31  0.000 0.106011**  10.60  0.000  0.107912**  5.38 0.000 0.109537*  2.36 0.019  0.291268**  5.64 0.000 
  0.032344     0.010003     0.020069     0.046440     0.051650   
ln  D/CCTF  -0.015275  -1.68  0.093 -0.006089*  -2.08  0.038  0.001238  0.31 0.757  0.000077  0.01 0.992  0.008147  0.98 0.326 
  0.009080     0.002931     0.003991     0.007993     0.008277   
ln  OI/A  -0.020971**  -5.28  0.000  -0.005941**  -6.00  0.000  -0.012527**  -4.12 0.000  0.000006  0.00 0.999 -0.005434 -0.54 0.589 
  0.003971     0.000989     0.003038     0.005953     0.010037   
year1998  0.039529**  3.69  0.000 0.019075**  7.59  0.000  0.104544**  9.36 0.000 0.043266*  2.33 0.021  0.027438  1.15 0.254 
  0.010718     0.002513     0.011165     0.018553     0.023954   
year1999  0.015598  1.69  0.092 0.021185**  9.21  0.000  0.042571**  5.13 0.000  0.066266**  4.05 0.000 0.043754*  2.32 0.021 
  0.009227     0.002301     0.008301     0.016367     0.018837   
year2000  0.027765**  3.05  0.002 0.014128**  6.18  0.000  0.074496** 10.66 0.000  0.021275  1.75 0.082  0.030065  1.49 0.139 
  0.009095     0.002287     0.006989     0.012168     0.020236   
year2001  0.012280  1.47  0.143  -0.009259**  -4.29  0.000  0.043777**  6.57 0.000 -0.000578  -0.05 0.964  0.005706  0.33 0.743 
  0.008378     0.002160     0.006662     0.012718     0.017351   
constant  0.433345*  2.45  0.014 1.456107**  24.52  0.000  2.599192** 17.58 0.000  2.324627**  7.68 0.000  0.191945  0.64 0.521 
  0.176581     0.059387     0.147859     0.302871     0.298743   
R-sq  (overall)  0.5057     0.253     0.6216     0.5499     0.4094      64
   F(12,473) = 132.42 (0.0000)  F(12,2994) = 464.34 (0.0000)  F(12,640) = 299.92  (0.0000)  F(12,216) = 73.59  (0.0000)  F(12,176) = 102.01 (0.0000) 
H-statistic 0.664811  22.29 0.000 0.664194  55.35 0.000 0.744698  31.98 0.000  0.835849  17.9 0.000  0.650726  17.81 0.000 
  0.0298256     0.012     0.0232898     0.0466921     0.0365335   
Wald test for 
H=1  F(1, 473) =126.30 ( 0.0000)  F(1,2994) =783.09 ( 0.0000)  F(1,640) =120.16 ( 0.0000)   F(1,216) =12.36 ( 0.0000)  F(1,176) =91.40 ( 0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  F(1, 473) =496.84 ( 0.0000)  F(1,2994) =3063.56 ( 0.0000)  F(1,640) =1022.42 ( 0.0000)   F(1,216) =320.46 ( 0.0000)  F(1,176) =317.26 ( 0.0000) 
Hausman test: 
Ho= RE vs FE :   chi2(12)=35.50 (0.0004)  chi2(12)=  565.27 (0.000)  chi2(12)=  19.57 (0.0757)  chi2(12)=  10.19 (0.5997)  chi2(12)=  117.10 (0.000) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test rejects 
the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance, for all countries except from Italy and Spain. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 




























Fixed effects model with time dummies: Dependent variable: Total operating Income/ Total Assets            
   FRANCE        GERMANY        ITALY        SPAIN        UK       
Variable  Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t  Coefficient  t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient t-stat  Prob>t Coefficient  t-stat  P
ln wL  0.570723**  20.94  0.000  0.485513** 31.98 0.000  0.491147** 17.57 0.000  0.404760**  7.01 0.000  0.338131**  5.68 
  0.027259     0.015183     0.027953     0.057705     0.059500    
ln wF    0.011975  0.66  0.507  0.048426** 2.94  0.003 0.040257 1.77  0.076 0.049249  0.87  0.387  0.346982** 5.60 
  0.018024     0.016485     0.022690     0.056834     0.061913   
ln wC  0.125589**  11.30  0.000  0.050919** 8.04  0.000  0.035206** 3.20  0.001 0.032852  1.46  0.145  0.011838 0.42 
  0.011111     0.006337     0.010987     0.022473     0.028059   
ln  E/A  -0.006718  -0.46  0.646  -0.009679 -0.74 0.457  0.028441  1.30 0.193 -0.050093  -1.88 0.061  -0.032044 -0.73 
  0.014640     0.013021     0.021843     0.026603     0.044142   
ln  LLP/L  0.020276**  3.70  0.000  0.039925** 20.03 0.000  0.034092**  4.95 0.000  0.032226**  2.84 0.005  0.059249**  3.43 
  0.005479     0.001994     0.006883     0.011337     0.017298   
ln  L/A  0.132341**  3.40  0.001  0.185844** 9.99  0.000  0.131389** 3.99  0.000 0.148450  1.97  0.049  0.667814** 7.88 
  0.038887     0.018612     0.032966     0.075193     0.084709   
ln  D/CCTF  0.006275  0.56  0.576  -0.020757** -3.64 0.000  -0.013199* -2.22 0.027  -0.032438*  -2.58 0.010  0.032956*  2.12 
  0.011224     0.005695     0.005942     0.012586     0.015542   
year1998  -0.022160  -1.65  0.099  0.050049** 11.12 0.000  0.160016** 10.20 0.000  0.139138**  4.97 0.000  -0.118727*  -2.52 
  0.013393     0.004500     0.015682     0.027970     0.047158   
year1999  -0.026191*  -2.24  0.025  0.059276** 14.37 0.000  0.043183**  3.67 0.000  0.125956**  4.61 0.000  -0.058351 -1.55 
  0.011668     0.004126     0.011775     0.027341     0.037669   
year2000  -0.007588  -0.66  0.510  0.007589 1.91  0.056  0.096227** 9.34  0.000  0.054912**  2.88  0.004  -0.062143  -1.50 
  0.011521     0.003974     0.010307     0.019050     0.041378   
year2001  -0.017099  -1.59  0.112 -0.024275** -6.32 0.000  0.040325**  4.06 0.000  0.056872**  2.96 0.003  -0.065664 -1.88 
  0.010736     0.003842     0.009929     0.019184     0.034988   
constant  2.595368**  12.82  0.000  2.308461** 20.54 0.000  2.613163** 12.07 0.000  2.383077**  4.93 0.000  -0.446997  -0.85 
  0.202425     0.112413     0.216573     0.483755     0.527400   
R-sq  (overall)  0.8156     0.7674     0.6211     0.6334     0.3965    
   F(11,592)=50.97 (0.0000)  F(11,4587)=204.06 (0.0000)  F(11,1237)=96.82 (0.0000)  F(11,271)=20.74 (0.0000)   F(11,230)=24.57 (0.0000)   66
H-statistic 0.708287  19.44 0.000  0.584858  27.93 0.000  0.566610  16.53 0.000  0.486860  7.08 0.000  0.696951  10.57 
  0.036438     0.0209426     0.0342816     0.068767     0.0659291   
Wald test for 
H=1  F(1,592) =64.09 (0.0000)  F(1,4587) =392.94 (0.0000)  F(1,1237) =159.82 (0.0000)  F(1, 271)=55.68 (0.0000)  F(1, 230) =21.13 (0.0000) 
Wald test for 
H=0  F(1, 592) =377.84 (0.0000)  F(1,4587) = 779.90 (0.0000)  F(1,1237) =273.18 (0.0000)  F(1, 271)=50.12 (0.0000)  F(1,230) =111.75 (0.0000) 
Hausman test: 
Ho= RE vs FE 
:   chi2(11)=66.92 (0.000)  chi2(11)=246.15 (0.000)  chi2(11)=23.66 (0.0143)  chi2(11)=14.59 (0.2023)  chi2(11)=26.21 (0.0060) 
where: wL=price of labour, wF=price of funds, wC=price of capital, E/A=equity/total assets, LLP/L=loss loan provisions/loans, L/A=loans/ total assets, D/CSTF= bank deposits/ customer & short-term 
funding, OI/A=other income/total assets. Standard errors in italics. Both the hypothesis for monopoly (H=0) and perfect competition (H=1) are rejected at 1% level of significance. Hausman test rejects 
the random effects (RE) vs fixed effects (FE) hypothesis at 1% level of significance, for all countries except from Italy and Spain. p-values in parentheses. 
**Significant at the 1% level of significance. 
*Significant at the 5% level of significance. 
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Annex 4: Equilibrium Tests 
 
 
1998-2002  ROA        ROE       
   H-statistic  St. Err.  Wald test for H=0  H-statistic  St. Err.  Wald test for H=0 
EU-15  -0.052057  0.046257  chi2(1) = 1.27   -0.056469  0.048194  chi2(1)=1.37  
     (0.2604)     (0.2413) 
new EU countries  0.200728  0.193855  chi2(1) =1.07   -0.058362  0.257305  chi2(1)=0.05  
     (0.3005)     (0.8206) 
France   -0.156045  0.127114  chi2(1)=1.51   -0.140248  0.128196  chi2(1)=1.20  
     (0.2196)     (0.2740) 
Germany  -0.018826  0.085501  chi2(1) = 0.05   -0.006325  0.088928  chi2(1) =0.01  
     (0.8257)     (0.9433) 
Italy   0.126044  0.122870  chi2(1) =1.05   0.172332  0.122953  chi2(1) =1.96  
     (0.3050)     (0.1610) 
Spain  -0.126646  0.220013  chi2(1) =0.33   -0.166290  0.219919  chi2(1) =0.57  
     (0.5649)     (0.4496) 
UK  0.008632  0.127137  chi2(1) =0.00   -0.012141  0.129379  chi2( 1) =0.01 
     (0.9459)     (0.9252) 
Large banks  -0.120647  0.206624  chi2(1) =0.34   0.041330  0.372770  chi2(1) = 0.01  
     (0.5593)     (0.9117) 
Medium-sized banks  -0.243125**  0.077485  chi2(1) = 9.85   -0.279303**  0.081048  chi2(1) =11.88  
     (0.0017)     (0.0006) 
Small banks  0.001748  0.056242  chi2(1) =0.00   0.000401  0.057087  chi2(1) = 0.00  
     (09752)     (0.9944) 
Linear regressions on equation (1) with heteroscedastic panels corrected standard errors and time dummies. As dependent variables we 
use alternatively ROA and ROE. H<0 is disequilibrium while H=0 is equilibrium. Equilibrium is confirmed for all banking markets 
under investigation, except from medium-sized banks, where H is significantly different from zero at 1% level of significance. p-
values in parentheses. 
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1998-2002  ROA        ROE       
   H-statistic  St. Err.  Wald test for H=0  H-statistic  St. Err.  Wald test for H=0 
EU-15 0.065224  0.079028  F(1,4752)=0.68    -0.012541 0.083215 F(1,4758)  =0.02   
     (0.4092)     (0.8802) 
new EU countries  0.346312  0.497539  F(1,164) =0.48   0.165383  0.601637   F(1,165) =0.08  
     (0.4874)     (0.7837) 
France   0.026762  0.213623  F(1,432) =0.02  0.059586  0.234660  F(1,433) = 0.06  
     (0.9004)     (0.7997) 
Germany -0.172358  0.158721  F(1,2777)  =1.18   -0.209222  0.166112  F(1,2780) =1.59  
     (0.2776)     (0.2079) 
Italy   0.657017**  0.239023  F(1,607) =7.56   0.712389*  0.246463  F(1, 608) =8.35  
     (0.0062)     (0.040) 
Spain 0.050583  0.316225  F(1,207)  =0.03    0.031216  0.301644  F(1,207) = 0.01  
     (0.8731)     (0.9177) 
UK  0.174268  0.238722   F(1,144) = 0.53   0.090134  0.249002  F(1,144) = 0.13  
     (0.4666)     (0.7179) 
Large banks  0.233588  0.377837  F(1, 162) =0.38   -0.378856  0.658033  F(1, 165) = 0.33  
     (0.5373)     (0.5656) 
Medium-sized banks  0.192511  0.148667  F(1,667) = 1.68   0.076527  0.164585  F(1, 669) = 0.22  
     (0.1958)     (0.6421) 
Small banks  -0.004295  0.095972  F(1,3899) = 0.00   -0.033211  0.097294  F(1,3900) = 0.12  
     (0.9643)     (0.7329) 
Least square regressions on equation (1) with fixed efffects and time dummies. As dependent variables we use alternatively ROA and 
ROE. H<0 is disequilibrium while H=0 is equilibrium. Equilibrium is confirmed for all banking markets under investigation, except 
from the case of Italy, where H is significantly different from zero at 1% level of significance for ROA and at 5% level for ROE. p-
values in parentheses. 
** H is significantly different from zero at 1%.  
* H is significantly different from zero at 5%.  
 
 
 
 
 